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Articles

A Proportionality-Based Framework for
Government Regulation of Digital
Tracing Apps in Times of Emergency
Sharon Bassan*
ABSTRACT
Times of emergency present an inherent conflict between
the public interest and the preservation of individual rights. Such
times require granting emergency powers to the government on
behalf of the public interest and relaxing safeguards against government actions that infringe rights. The lack of theoretical
framework to assess governmental decisions in times of emergency leads to a polarized and politicized discourse about potential policies, and often, to public distrust and lack of compliance.
Such a discourse was evident regarding Digital Tracing Apps
(“DTAs”), which are apps installed on cellular phones to alert
users that they were exposed to people who tested positive for
COVID-19. DTAs collect the most sensitive types of information,
such as health-related and location or proximity information,
which violates the right to privacy and the right to be free of surveillance. This sensitive information is normally legally protected.
But in emergencies there are no legal restrictions limiting the collection of such data. The common privacy-law approach supports
* I want to thank Professor Josh Sarnoff and Ms. Shelly Pasternak for their tremendous help in constructing this Article.

361

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-2\DIK201.txt

362

unknown

Seq: 2

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

9-FEB-22

10:44

[Vol. 126:361

DTA implementation under the condition that the technology
preserves the privacy of users. But this Article suggests that the
privacy approach focuses on micro considerations and under-addresses the implications of DTA-based policy.
Instead, this Article suggests rethinking DTA implementation during COVID-19 through the doctrine of proportionality.
Often used by European Union courts in areas where decisions
entail meaningful implications to individual rights, the doctrine
offers a clear and workable normative evaluation of tradeoffs in a
more nuanced, explicable, and transparent way. Highlighting
macro considerations, the doctrine of proportionality suggests
that 1) DTA-based policy is less proportionate compared to
traditional contact-tracing methods; 2) policies created while relying on smartphones are inequitable and biased; and 3) the sharing of sensitive personal information with private companies will
have irreversible social surveillance implications. Additionally,
the proportionality method not only provides a flexible methodological tool to evaluate government decisions in times of emergency but also offers an opportunity to examine how
governments achieve and justify the acceptance and assimilation
of new technological policy measures, which may take societies in
new directions.
Part I establishes the framework of governance during
COVID-19, the use of emergency powers, and the conflict between the public interest and individual rights. Part II explores
the value of using the doctrine of proportionality as a method for
policymaking during emergencies. Part III applies the doctrine of
proportionality to the case study of DTA-based policy, exploring
the parameters of its suitability, necessity, and proportionality
stricto sensu. Proportionality stricto sensu assesses the desirability
and relative proportionality of three policies that have been used
to promote the public interest in different ways: a general shelter-at-home policy, a traditional-contact-tracing policy, and a
DTA-based policy. Part IV discusses the policy implications of
using a DTA-based policy.
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BACKGROUND

A. COVID-19 Public Health Emergency
December of 2019 brought with it reports of people getting
sick in the city of Wuhàn, People’s Republic of China. The virus
(Sars-Cov-2) was familiar as part of the Coronavirus family that had
previously introduced us to the SARS virus, yet different from what
we have previously known. It was extremely contagious; symptoms
varied drastically between patients (from asymptomatic to severe),
and in the beginning, it was (wrongly) perceived to be more deadly
than previously known SARS viruses.1 Within a few weeks, the virus traveled to Europe, and within a few more weeks, the number
of infected people grew exponentially.2 The world faced a pandemic
1. But see Jill Seladi-Schulman, COVID-19 vs. SARS: How Do They Differ?
HEALTHLINE, https://bit.ly/3mc8UM3 [https://perma.cc/EA8C-FB5Z] (Sept. 15,
2021) (clarifying that SARS has a higher mortality rate than COVID-19 at “about
10 percent, with some patient populations having a mortality rate as high as 45
percent”).
2. Gianfranco Spiteri et al., First Cases of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID19) in the WHO European Region, 24 January to 21 February 2020, 25
EUROSURVEILLANCE 1, 3 (2020).
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that has caused, to this day, more than 820,355 deaths in the United
States alone.3
Experts were ignorant of the virus’s behavior, the methods by
which it transferred (e.g., through contact with skin, surfaces, air,
etc.), and its resilience (whether it can survive environmental
changes, such as changes in temperature). As a result, it was hard to
estimate how many people might be infected, to identify populations at risk, or to assess the impact on health systems. The Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) reconvened
the Emergency Committee (“EC”) in January of 2020.4 The EC
“reached consensus and advised the Director-General that the outbreak constituted a Public Health Emergency of International
Concern.”5
Once governments announce a national public health emergency, their emergency powers, which are brought into play in exceptional circumstances, go into effect.6 Coercive public health
powers include measures of surveillance, investigation, and intervention that may infringe individual civil liberties such as rights to
due process, freedom of speech, assembly, travel, and privacy.7 The
COVID-19 pandemic led to sweeping governmental actions that
drastically affected the lives of citizens in ways that would not have
been imaginable a year prior. States were placing new restrictions
on their citizens: closing national borders, restricting air traffic, enforcing self-isolation, closing education institutions and teaching remotely via the internet, and prohibiting gathering or physical
activity done outdoors. These new restrictions gained normative legitimacy because the pandemic required that the government en-

3. United States COVID-19 Cases, Deaths, and Laboratory Testing (NAATs)
by State, Territory, and Jurisdiction, CDC, https://bit.ly/3EGZuQ7 [https://
perma.cc/ULK4-28AC] (last visited Dec. 31, 2021).
4. Statement on the Second Meeting of the International Health Regulations
(2005) Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus (2019nCoV), WHO (Jan. 30, 2020), https://bit.ly/3icwsy3 [https://perma.cc/E7CBMKAF].
5. Archived: WHO Timeline—COVID-19, WHO (Apr. 27, 2020), https://
bit.ly/3EK16ID [https://perma.cc/7RK6-SFC4]; see also Statement on the Second
Meeting of the International Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Novel
Coronavirus (2019-nCov), WHO (Jan. 30, 2020), https://bit.ly/3zy2DxY [https://
perma.cc/E7CB-MKAF] (agreeing that the outbreak now meets the criteria for a
Public Health Emergency of International Concern).
6. Ronald Bayer, The Continuing Tensions Between Individual Rights and
Public Health, 8 EMBO REPS. 1099, 1100–01 (2007).
7. Id.
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sure public safety, protect health, and secure the rights and
freedoms of others.8 But the toll on individual rights was heavy.
B. Digital Tracing Apps to Join Public Health Efforts
To confront the emergency, permit economies to open, and
make the process of public health surveillance more efficient, governments around the world have been considering the use of Digital
Tracing Apps (“DTAs”) to trace exposure to COVID-19 and confirm cases.9 The smartphone apps identify and alert users who have
been exposed to individuals diagnosed as carrying the virus. Since
COVID-19 can be transmitted by someone before they are symptomatic, these apps can detect people who are exposed to others who
are carrying the virus prior to any official diagnosis. DTAs can recommend self-isolation to break the chain of transmission and may
also display useful instructions or videos about tests, treatments,
preventing infections, and current policies on self-isolation
requirements.
The two main technologies used by DTAs to trace user contacts are location-history matching and proximity tracing. Locationhistory matching is based on geolocation, which is determined by a
Global Positioning System (GPS), a common feature that exists on
most smartphones through apps such as Google Maps. In addition
to providing information to the individual, location-history matching provides information on the population density over time, measured against a baseline dataset from pre-pandemic times. Such
analysis is useful for several purposes: (1) creating mobility reports
that assess the public’s response to interventions in terms of the
rate of movement; (2) assessing the impact of social distancing on
the spread of the virus; (3) determining containment measures and
anticipating peaks of contamination; (4) assisting in risk modeling
that could help public health authorities; and (5) planning urban

8. Olga Halub-Kowalczyk, Redefining the Right to Privacy in the Age of the
COVID-19 Pandemic, I-CONNECT: INT’L J. CONST. L. (Apr. 2, 2020), https://bit.ly/
3nL0z3i [https://perma.cc/6DMY-TFQ3].
9. Mia Sato, Contact Tracing Apps Now Cover Nearly Half of America. It’s
Not Too Late to Use One, MIT TECH. REV.: PANDEMIC TECH. PROJECT (Dec. 14,
2020), https://bit.ly/3Exleh4 [https://perma.cc/6YU7-HBC3].
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and transit infrastructure.10 But, GPS violates user privacy because
it tracks all places visited by users all day, every day.11
In contrast, proximity-tracing apps record to whom users are
near, instead of recording where users are.12 These apps can be designed in different ways, but they all function similarly: they broadcast a unique identifying log number, measure signal strength, and
keep track of the log numbers received. Each app has a time and
distance threshold to notify users. When 2 users of an app come
near each other, the apps estimate the distance between 2 phones
(e.g., 6 feet) and the duration of exposure (e.g., 15 minutes) to determine whether 2 smartphones were close enough together for
their users to be at risk.13 When a user reports her confirmed diagnosis of COVID-19, the app detects which tracked Bluetooth logs
from the previous two weeks meet the distance and time threshold.
For example, if the app estimates that log numbers are less than six
feet apart for a sufficient amount of time, it alerts individuals that
they are at risk.
At their core, DTAs try to imitate the contact tracing and public health surveillance traditionally conducted by public health authorities. The goals of traditional methods—the surveillance and
detection of cases—are key responses to a pandemic.14 The public
health community uses analytic tools to (1) detect, characterize,
monitor, and respond to events of public health concern; (2) iden10. Natasha Lomas, Google Is Now Publishing Coronavirus Mobility Reports,
Feeding Off Users’ Location History, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 3, 2020, 9:19 AM) https:/
/tcrn.ch/3vNWm0D [https://perma.cc/2TQG-JLE6]; Caroline O. Buckee et al., Aggregated Mobility Data Could Help Fight COVID-19, 368 SCIENCE 145, 145 (2020)
(advocating for the use of mobility data collected by private companies); see Ellen
Sheng, Facebook, Google Discuss Sharing Smartphone Data with Government to
Fight Coronavirus, but There Are Risks, CNBC: TECH DRIVERS, https://cnb.cx/
2XzT7gT [https://perma.cc/8SCP-AA7P] (Mar. 19, 2020, 3:01 PM) (“Direct Relief,
a California-based disaster-relief organization, has been working with mapping
tools such as those at Facebook to track population movements during natural
disasters, like hurricanes or wildfires, to determine evacuation patterns and if people are leaving the fire perimeter zone.”).
11. See Manage Your Location History, GOOGLE ACCOUNT HELP, https://
bit.ly/3i0LQ0x [https://perma.cc/2EVD-FB3E] (last visited Oct. 25, 2021).
12. See WHO Team, Infection Prevention and Control: Contact Tracing,
WHO (May 9, 2017), https://bit.ly/3CqFxek [https://perma.cc/ZZW6-K7T2].
13. Andrew Crocker, Kurt Opsahl & Bennett Cyphersa, The Challenge of
Proximity Apps for COVID-19 Contact Tracing, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr.
10, 2020), https://bit.ly/3kpDFw9 [https://perma.cc/UNB7-D8U4].
14. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN 23 (2005), https://bit.ly/3lGlFx3 [https://perma.cc/R6T8-WXTQ] (explaining the rationale for virologic and disease surveillance, such as identifying
“trends in influenza disease activity and identify populations that are severely
affected”).
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tify concentrated areas requiring more resources; and (3) signal
anomalies, health risks, and interventions to keep people safer and
healthier. Surveillance of the travel history, movement, and body
temperature of a person diagnosed with COVID-19 informs decision makers of the spread of the pandemic, of concentrated areas
that require more resources, and of locations requiring lockdowns.
Public health authorities traditionally collect this information
through public health surveillance and contact-tracing interviews.15
An obvious concern regarding DTAs is the requirement to collect sensitive information that is essential for DTAs to function and
the requirement to share such sensitive information as part of pandemic protocols, rather than keep it confidential. DTAs collect and
process health and location or proximity information, regardless of
whether users are healthy or infected. Location, health, and proximity information are considered to be the most sensitive types of
data, and collecting them violates an individual’s right to privacy
and right to be free of surveillance.16 When locations reveal what
people are doing, or when proximity features reveal with whom
people connect, people might begin to refrain from participating in
activities and associations that may be considered controversial in
fear of being monitored.17 Free association is required for citizens
to shape their social and political lives, and it is a central necessity
for democratic participation.18 New civilian surveillance technologies challenged these rights by conducting generalized, invisible,
real-time surveillance of people protesting race and policing follow-

15. Public Health Surveillance and Data: Strategies for Improvement, CDC,
https://bit.ly/3nTAQ8O [https://perma.cc/TU4N-HJFM] (Jan. 26, 2021); WHO,
WHO GLOBAL INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS PLAN 26–27 (2005), https://bit.ly/
2XLoOUy [https://perma.cc/U48C-CFLK] (noting the reasons for surveillance, including identifying initial cases, contacts, and the spread of infection; detecting,
characterizing, and assessing clusters of influenza-like illness or respiratory deaths,
with provision for surge capacity and inter-sectoral and inter-institutional collaboration; and gaining more information on viruses to update the description of the
epidemiological, virological, and clinical features of the infection and its possible
source).
16. See Kinfe Micheal Yilma, Bill of Rights for the 21st Century: Some Lessons
from the Internet Bill of Rights Movement, INT’L J. HUM. RTS., Aug. 2, 2021, at 1, 5.
17. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, The Constitutional Limits of Private Surveillance,
66 KAN. L. REV. 485, 492–98 (2018) (reviewing studies that demonstrate the impact of governmental online surveillance on users’ behavior); Karen Gullo, Surveillance Chills Speech—as New Studies Show—and Free Association Suffers,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 19, 2016), https://bit.ly/2XsReSC [https://perma.cc/
A3YM-3VR6].
18. See Julie Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1912
(2013) (noting that diminished privacy can threaten liberal democracy).
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ing the death of George Floyd.19 Such surveillance is being conducted when the usual legal protections on individual rights and
restrictions on government actions do not apply. For example, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act20 (HIPAA),
which addresses the protection and portability of personal health
information belonging to people who seek care under national standards, does not protect information collected during an emergency.21 Surveillance leads to a chilling effect on policed activities;
diminishes individual and collective autonomy, rights, and interests;
and undermines the flourishing of society. Maintaining these rights
can outweigh public health interests, which may be why individual
rights that contest coercive public health powers have remained unrestricted, even during the COVID-19 emergency.22
C. Emergency Governmental Powers: An Inherent Conflict
Between the Public Interest and Individual Rights
Under normal circumstances, constitutional limits restrain governments from taking disproportionate, oppressive, and arbitrary
actions that can interfere with the fulfillment of citizens’ rights.23
However, in emergency situations—such as the COVID-19 pandemic—the best practices of ordinary times cannot always be maintained. Times of emergency have a dualistic nature: public interest
requires governments to adopt policies to address the emergency
even at the price of infringing on some individual rights, but governments must nevertheless strive for minimum infringement of
those rights. Often, the toolbox of emergency powers used to respond to public health emergencies includes some infringement of
rights, which are protected only to the extent reasonable and tolerable under the circumstances.24 Thus, during emergencies, laws limit19. Umberto Bacchi & Avi Asher-Schapiro, Debate on Surveillance and Privacy Heats Up as U.S. Protests Rage, REUTERS (June 1, 2020, 8:53 PM), https://
reut.rs/3tT0Nqa [https://perma.cc/Z8NR-C6X2].
20. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
21. See infra Section III.A.3.
22. See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act:
Public Health and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX: J.
L.-MED. 3, 12–13 (2013); see also Michael Nwogugu, Chapter-7: Complex Systems
Challenges: Epidemics, the Welfare-State and the Constitution 27 (Apr. 10, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the right of association
versus the public interest during COVID-19).
23. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124
YALE L.J. 3094, 3108 (2015).
24. Justin Bernstein et al., Grappling with the Ethics of Social Distancing: A
Framework for Evaluating Social Distancing Policies and Reopening Plans 11
(Apr. 17, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with John Hopkins Berman Inst.
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ing a government’s power to infringe on the rights of its citizens are
relaxed, enabling the government to adapt and implement responses that would otherwise be unacceptable. As a result, some
tradeoffs between certain rights and public health interests are unavoidable. In these circumstances, governments may partially suspend basic rights, including the privacy of health information in
favour of the public interest.25
Highly restrictive actions that infringe on rights are essential to
preserve public health during a pandemic. For example, the Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act26 grants state and local public
health authorities the power to ensure that planning, prevention,
and response mechanisms are strong, effective, and timely during
public health emergencies.27 It also immunizes officials from liability if their acts abuse individual rights and cause injury.28 It gives
public health agents broad authority to track, prevent, and control
disease while also limiting the time, duration, and scope of their
authority to abate serious public health threats.29 Additionally,
courts have previously recognized the government’s authority to
of Bioethics); see also H. McD Clokie, Emergency Powers and Civil Liberties, 13
CAN. J. ECON. & POL. SCI., 384, 389 (1947) (reviewing the nature and extent of
emergency powers and their constitutional basis).
25. Compare Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (noting that in Europe, according to
Article 15 of the ECHR, “in time of war or other public emergency . . . any State
may take measures derogating from its obligations under the Convention to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law”), with
Directive 2002/58, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002
Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the
Electronic Communications Sector ¶36, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, 41 (EC) (“Member
States may restrict the users’ and subscribers’ rights to privacy with regard to calling line identification and location data where this is necessary to allow emergency
services to carry out their tasks as effectively as possible.”).
26. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (CTR. FOR L. & THE
PUB.’S HEALTH, Proposed Draft 2001). For examples of states that passed regulations based on this act, see Joneigh S. Khaldun, In Context: The Turning Point
Model State Public Health Act, 12 AMA J. ETHICS 731, 732 (2010).
27. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (CTR. FOR L. & THE
PUB.’S HEALTH, Proposed Draft 2001). Compare Lawrence O. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far Are Limitations on Human Rights Justified?, 31
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 524, 527 (2003) (discussing the justifications for limiting
human rights during public health emergencies), with GEORGE J. ANNAS, WORST
CASE BIOETHICS: DEATH, DISASTER, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 229 (2010) (discussing
the bioethics behind controversial public health decisions during worst case
scenarios).
28. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 804.
29. Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers
Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious
Diseases, 288 JAMA 622, 625 (2002).
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quarantine, prevent travel, require vaccinations, and make people
submit to medical exams.30
The public health exception subverts traditional constitutional
limitations and other legal rules or procedures levied against governments. Whether unconstitutional or extra-constitutional,31 emergency powers are not covered by the regular provisions of
constitutional systems. Under HIPAA, authorities have emergency
powers that allow them to act outside of their usual legal obligations.32 To manage the spread of infections, covered entities may
use or disclose Protected Health Information (PHI), including identity contacts, to notify those “who may have been exposed to a
communicable disease or may otherwise be at risk of contracting or
spreading a disease.”33 These entities may also use or disclose PHI
if such notification is authorized by law and necessary to conduct a
“public health intervention or investigation.”34 HIPAA permits, but
does not require, covered entities to share PHI with a public health
authority without an individual’s authorization “for the purpose of
preventing or controlling disease, injury, or disability, including, but
not limited to, the reporting of disease” and “public health surveillance, public health investigations.”35 If required, HIPAA’s exceptions permit the disclosure and use of PHI to non-public-health
30. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (finding that a
“well-ordered society . . . [may] enforc[e] . . . reasonable regulations, as the safety
of the general public may demand”); Polly J. Price, Quarantine and Liability in the
Context of Ebola, 131 PUB. HEALTH REP. 500, 501 (2015); John Kruzel, Response
to Coronavirus Could Test Limits of Government Powers, HILL (March 11, 2020,
6:00 AM), https://bit.ly/3ArcEhD [https://perma.cc/8H8R-ERWZ] (“Major legal
decisions about quarantines, which have mostly been decided by state supreme
courts, are quite dated.”).
31. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5–15 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2005);
Clokie supra note 24, at 385.
32. See infra Section III.A.2.
33. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(iv) (2020).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 164.512(b)(1)(i). In normal times, a covered entity may not use or
disclose PHI except (1) as is permitted or required by HIPAA’s Privacy Rule or (2)
when the subject of the information authorizes the disclosure in writing. Id.
§ 164.512. While not a typical case of informed consent, the process of obtaining an
authorization should inform individuals in advance about how their information
will be used or disclosed. For the general rule on using and disclosing PHI, see 45
C.F.R. § 164.502(a). For uses that require authorization, see 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.508(a)(1). For the requirements of a valid authorization, see 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.508(c)(1) (including these core elements: a description of the information to
be used or disclosed; identification of persons authorized to make the requested
use or disclosure; identification of the those to whom the covered entity may make
the disclosure; a description of each purpose of the disclosure; and an expiration
date with respect to each purpose).
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entities during COVID-19.36 Efforts to monitor and control the
COVID-19 pandemic have complied with disclosure requirements
under HIPAA’s Privacy Rule.37
Previous cases show that emergency and surveillance powers
are normalized and rarely go away after an emergency ends.38 Personal data initially collected for national security purposes in times
of emergency continues to be collected past the emergency to facilitate different ends, such as monitoring dissent movements and ensuring societal conformity.39 For example, after more than 20 years
since 9/11, the NSA is still conducting internet surveillance.40 Laws
originally enacted to address 9/11 have been amended to allow the
U.S. government to continue gathering, storing, and processing
data.41 There is also international evidence of similar surveillance
36. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (listing a covered entity’s permissible uses and
disclosures of PHI, including for health oversight activities authorized by law; for
research purposes; and “to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the
health or safety of a person or the public”).
37. See 45 C.F.R pt. 164, subpart E (acknowledging that HIPAA’s Privacy
Rule accepts some erosion of privacy when trying to balance the need to obtain the
information required for public health surveillance with the need to preserve privacy); see also HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 110 (2006), https://bit.ly/39kGzvV [https://
perma.cc/3BX9-UAPC] (containing a single reference to privacy in the context of
the Influenza pandemic, which implies that protecting privacy is not a priority).
38. Ayse Ceyhan, Surveillance as Biopower, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
SURVEILLANCE STUDIES 38, 38 (Kirstie Ball et al. eds., 2012); Brandon J. Johnson,
Executives in Crisis: An Examination of Formal and Informal Emergency Powers,
42 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 341, 405 (2020); Adam Klein & Edward Felten, The 9/11
Playbook for Protecting Privacy, POLITICO (Apr. 4, 2020, 11:11 AM), https://
politi.co/3Cz5rwF [https://perma.cc/M5D6-DTET]; Arjun Kharpal, Use of Surveillance to Fight Coronavirus Raises Concerns About Government Power After Pandemic Ends, CNBC: TECH, https://cnb.cx/3nQI0uK [https://perma.cc/T4BL-B592]
(Mar. 30, 2020, 12:17 PM); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Government Surveillance in an
Age of Pandemics, LAWFARE (Mar. 23, 2020, 4:20 PM), https://bit.ly/3nR1Y8E
[https://perma.cc/UG9G-F23F]; Isobel Asher Hamilton, Edward Snowden Says
COVID-19 Could Give Governments Invasive New Data-Collection Powers That
Could Last Long After the Pandemic, INSIDER (Mar. 27, 2020, 8:37 AM), https://
bit.ly/3Cs9o6a [https://perma.cc/4WSQ-YJW6].
39. Jan-Werner Mueller, Beware Viral Enabling Acts, PROJECT SYNDICATE
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://bit.ly/3u2Q7Fp [https://perma.cc/XFZ2-L8QZ] (describing
the “super-majoritarian escalator,” which allows periodic renewals of laws and decrees only if larger majorities agree and noting that this mechanism questions
whether a return to ordinary times is possible and highlights the protection of basic
rights).
40. Adam Schwartz, How EFF Evaluates Government Demands for New Surveillance Powers, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 3, 2020), https://bit.ly/3CqPJUf
[https://perma.cc/D6AN-8PL2].
41. Sean McDonald, No, We Don’t Need an App for This, NEW HUMANITARIAN (Mar. 30, 2020), https://bit.ly/3lHpcLB [https://perma.cc/9U7G-ZKK9] (“[I]n
the United States, the post-9/11 PATRIOT Act (a raft of counter-terrorism measures) is set for bi–partisan renewal, 19 years later.”); see, e.g., Hina Shamsi & Alex
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and data collection in pandemics. During the MERS outbreak of
2015, the South Korean government said it would stop informationcollection efforts and delete all personal data when the outbreak
ended.42 However, despite being criticized for withholding the data
of patients after the outbreak, South Korea amended its laws to
improve its ability to track people.43 Additionally, in the summer of
2020, Singapore assured its citizens that data collected from the digital TraceTogether application would be used exclusively for contact
tracing. In early January 2021, however, Singapore reneged on that
promise by announcing that “[t]he Singapore Police Force is empowered . . . to obtain any data, including TraceTogether data, for
criminal investigations.”44 Currently, there is no specific condition
that compels the authorities to return to their pre-pandemic standards of governance and waive their excessive emergency powers.
Given the nature of excessive government emergency powers,
poor legal responses can have serious costs.45 The conflict between
politics and law—present since time immemorial46—reaches its
peak during emergencies.47 Regardless of how their political systems are socially or economically designed, democratic societies
ought to strive for individual liberty. As such, basis protections are
needed to ensure that the government’s discretionary powers are
accompanied by reasonable procedures that protect individuals
against discrimination and arbitrary, illogical, partisan, or personal
persecution.48 A policy that compromises personal liberties should
therefore be thoroughly justified and chosen only if it yields significant gains proportionate to the significant losses of liberties. Several
suggestions have been made in the context of public health.49 HowAbdo, Privacy and Surveillance Post-9/11, A.B.A. (Jan. 1, 2011), https://bit.ly/
3ClBLTA [https://perma.cc/N7F2-DGEG] (discussing amendments to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act).
42. Anthony Kuhn, South Korea Admits Keeping Personal Data of 2015
MERS Outbreak Patients, NPR (June 23, 2020, 3:55 PM) https://n.pr/3kselG5
[https://perma.cc/VG6J-U8GL].
43. Jedidiah Bracy, On Balancing Personal Privacy with Public Interest, IAPP
(Mar. 6. 2020), https://bit.ly/3CsJE9D [https://perma.cc/YEA5-VGSL].
44. Laurel Wamsley, Singapore Says COVID-19 Contact-Tracing Data Can Be
Requested by Police, NPR (Jan. 5, 2021, 3:42 PM), https://n.pr/3zsdXvc [https://
perma.cc/PFN6-ZC58].
45. Leslie E. Gerwin, Planning for Pandemic: A New Model for Governing
Public Health Emergencies, 37 AM. J.L. MED. & ETHICS 128, 154 (2011).
46. See, e.g., PLATO, EUTHYPHRO (n.d.).
47. Luigi Farrajoli, The Past and the Future of the Rule of Law, in THE RULE
OF LAW, HISTORY, THEORY AND CRITICISM 323, 336–37 (Pietro Costa & Danilo
Zolo eds., 2007).
48. Clokie supra note 24, at 393.
49. Gerwin, supra note 45, at 144 (proposing an emergency republic paradigm
“supported by new mechanisms for justification and accountability of executive
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ever, the law has not yet developed a clear and systematic way to
address the validity and the scope of limitations on a government’s
ability to impose emergency policies.50 Instead, a vigorous debate
has emerged as to whether DTAs-based policy is a desirable or necessary tool.51
To address the tension between the public interest and individual rights and to evaluate the legitimacy of DTA-based policy, public, private and governmental institutions have focused primarily on
privacy-preserving aspects of DTAs. Both European and U.S. bodies have concluded that as long as DTAs are designed to preserve
the privacy of user information, they are a desirable policy measure.52 There is quite a strong consensus that people should not
have to choose between their health and their privacy.53 Many leading public, private, and governmental institutions, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the WHO, the
European parliament, and companies such as Microsoft, Google,
and Apple, incorporated somewhat overlapping privacy-preserving
principles into the designs of DTAs. Additionally, Congress has introduced the Exposure Notification Privacy Act to prevent potenaction,” including a positive-mandate mechanism “that requires the independent
and expert members of the technocracy to advise the executive on the declaration
and termination of a state of emergency, and the other a normative constraint of
executive power to derogate individual rights”). Gerwin also suggests “that in determining what role they should assume in protecting the public’s health, legislators should be guided by the advice that Hippocrates gave to physicians: ‘First, do
no harm.’ ” Id. at 158. The proportionality paradigm proposed here can be incorporated into the decision to declare and terminate an emergency.
50. Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, U.S. Emergency Legal Responses
to Novel Coronavirus: Balancing Public Health and Civil Liberties, 323 JAMA
1131, 1132 (2020) (noting that “compulsory public health powers should be evaluated and justified under a common legal and ethical standard” but that there is no
organized legal framework to balance public interests and individual rights).
51. See, e.g., Re-Opening the Nation: Privacy, Surveillance, and Digital Tools
for Contact Tracing, HASTINGS CTR. (May 18, 2020), https://bit.ly/2Zb8tbT [https://
perma.cc/4D5T-W22X]; Casey Ross, After 9/11, We Gave Up Privacy for Security.
Will We Make the Same Trade-off After Covid-19?, STAT: HEALTH TECH (Apr. 8,
2020), https://bit.ly/3AtKtym [https://perma.cc/FP3H-JNSU]; Cansu Canca, Why
‘Mandatory Privacy-Preserving Digital Contact Tracing’ Is the Ethical Measure
Against COVID-19, MEDIUM (Apr. 10, 2020), https://bit.ly/3kqMZ2X [https://
perma.cc/KY2J-TZ28].
52. See infra Appendix A; see also Enlisting Big Data in the Fight Against
Coronavirus Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 116th Cong. 10
(2020) (statement of Stacey Gray, Senior Counsel, Future of Privacy Forum)
(stressing the need for “baseline federal consumer privacy legislation”).
53. E.g., Michael Birnhack, A Process-Based Approach to Informational Privacy and the Case of Big Medical Data, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 257 (2019);
A Thing By, Yuval Noah Harari on The World Before, During and After
Coronavirus, YOUTUBE (Apr. 17, 2020), https://bit.ly/3Av5w3I [https://perma.cc/
AG39-RSSR].
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tial abuse of DTAs.54 It has been recommended that privacypreserving designs55 should include security safeguards, data integrity, data minimization, limited use, time of storage (a sunset
clause), and restricted access.56 Despite these recommendations,
this Article suggests that while data privacy should concern decision
makers, focusing exclusively on privacy creates an incomplete
analysis.
This Article looks at the issue from the point of view of emergency policymaking. It pursues one promising framework for policy
evaluation: the doctrine of proportionality. This doctrine is traditionally applied by public health authorities. It offers a procedural
method for evaluating DTA-based policy, which assesses the tradeoffs between the public interest and individual rights. Such a
method is broader than the privacy-law approach, which focuses on
implementing privacy-preserving features in DTA use. Beyond this
COVID-19 case study, the proportionality analysis is helpful in
evaluating how governments achieve and justify the acceptance and
assimilation of new technological policy measures that may move
society in new directions.
II. THE DOCTRINE

OF

PROPORTIONALITY FRAMEWORK

The primary goal of the doctrine of proportionality is to impose some limits on otherwise authorized government action, to
prevent government abuse of power, and to ensure that any impact
on civil rights is mitigated.57 The doctrine of proportionality evaluates how governmental bodies balance their powers to act with how
their actions would infringe on the rights of those who are subjected
to them. It offers a systematic, transparent doctrinal structure to
balance these competing interests. The methodology is multilayered; the first two steps focus on the means to accomplish the
objective.58 The third step is normative, comparing competing interests and alternatives. Step I, suitability, asks whether the measure
taken can achieve its goal technically and practically. Step II, necessity, asks whether the measure taken is necessary to achieve a legitimately pursued goal. Step III, proportionality stricto sensu, requires
54. Exposure Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861, 116th Cong. (2020) (regulating contact-tracing apps by making the use of such systems voluntary and limiting
the types of information that can be collected).
55. A privacy-preserving design chooses features that will better protect the
privacy of DTA users.
56. See infra Appendix A.
57. H.D. Gunnarsdóttir et al., Applying the Proportionality Principle to
COVID-19 Antibody Testing, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 4 (2020).
58. For a discussion about the objective of DTAs, see infra III.A.
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governmental decisions affecting freedoms and rights to maintain a
reasonable balance between the public interest and the intrusion on
individual rights. It also requires a proper proportion between the
means utilized and the government’s objective.59 Where there is a
choice between several suitable options, the least burdensome and
harmful policy must be pursued.60
A. Proportionality Use in U.S. Law
The doctrine of proportionality is philosophically embedded in
theories of punishment. The main principle is that “penalties [must]
be proportionate in their severity to the gravity of the defendant’s
criminal conduct.”61 Traditionally, theories of punishment have
been either consequentialist (i.e., concerned with the supposed effects of punishment) or deontological (i.e., concerned with the
moral justification of a punishment, rather than the consequences).
Consequentialist theories focus on the benefits associated with discouraging criminal behavior.62 The most significant challenge to the
consequentialist approach came from Immanuel Kant’s principle
that people should not be treated merely as means to an end (i.e.,
punished to induce others to desist from crime). Rather, Kant prefers a retributive method for punishment, which “requires each person to be treated as being of value in him or herself.63 According to
the Kantian approach, a “person’s punishment depend[s] on his
own deserts rather than on the penalty’s societal benefits.”64 Under
the retributive theory of justice, it is “unjust to punish a wrongdoer
more than she deserves.”65 This method requires that the punishment be proportional to the wrongful act.66 If the sanction is condemnatory rather than preventive, the “severity of the response
ought to reflect the . . . gravity of the criminal conduct.”67 Moreover, basing punishment on the gravity of crime encourages self-restraint because citizens would consider the punishment to be more
59. Aharon Barak, Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience, 57 U. TOL.J. 369, 372–74 (2007).
60. Gunnarsdóttir et al., supra note 57, at 4.
61. Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16
CRIME & JUST. 55, 55 (1992).
62. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 158–64 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Clarendon Press 1996)
(1780).
63. Von Hirsch, supra note 61, at 59.
64. Id.
65. Alec Walen, Retributive Justice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https://
stanford.io/3hO7LI2 [https://perma.cc/EG2Y-PCBW] (July 31, 2020).
66. Von Hirsch, supra note 61, at 74.
67. Id. at 70.
RONTO
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just.68 In this sense, the principle of proportionality is a requirement
of fairness, whether explained in terms of a just allocation of the
“benefits” and “burdens” of law-abidingness, or as a way of expressing blame or censure of criminal wrongdoing.69
The doctrine of proportionality was developed after World
War II to limit legislative power.70 Because the doctrine is a wellestablished principle of EU law, the European Union will take only
necessary action and nothing more.71 The doctrine is also used in
the German, Canadian, and Israeli legal systems.72 The doctrine of
proportionality is usually applied by courts ex post facto in areas
where decisions have meaningful effects on individual rights, such
as constitutional law, human rights law, criminal law, antitrust law,
and war law.73
Several elements of proportionality are currently being used by
U.S. courts. For example, courts use proportionality in Eighth
Amendment analysis by requiring a sufficiently important or “compelling” government purpose, a rational connection between the
means chosen and the end, and a “minimal impairment” inquiry
into whether there are less restrictive means towards the same
goal.74 Additionally, “legislation under Section 5 of the [14th]
Amendment must have ‘congruence and proportionality’ to conduct that Section 1 prohibits.”75 Meaning, when the Supreme Court
68. Id. at 68.
69. Id. at 68.
70. Jackson, supra note 23, at 3110.
71. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5, ¶ 4, Oct.
26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 (“[T]he content and form of Union action shall not
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.”).
72. Jackson, supra note 23, at 3110; see also Gráinne de Búrca, Reappraising
Subsidiarity’s Significance After Amsterdam (Harv., Working Paper No. 7/99, 2000)
(explaining that proportionality principles were initially accepted in European
Council Conclusions at Edinburgh in 1992, then adopted into the Interinstitutional
Agreement in 1993, and eventually codified in the EC Treaty by the Amsterdam
Treaty).
73. See Gunnarsdóttir et al., supra note 57, at 3. For example:
In Europe, the proportionality principle is applied by the European
Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union.
National courts may also apply their own variation of the proportionality
principle. The German Federal Constitutional Court, for example, may
apply the ‘principle of practical concordance,’ in the case of conflicting
constitutional rights.
Id.
74. Jackson, supra note 23, at 3119, 3104 n.43–44; Jud Mathews & Alec Stone
Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 864 (2011) (showing that all three levels of review—
rational basis, intermediate review, and strict scrutiny—have, at various points in
their evolution, contained core elements of proportionality).
75. Jackson, supra note 23, at 3105.
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reviews enforcement legislation, it demands that “the unconstitutional behavior of the States and the means by which Congress has
chosen to eradicate it” be congruent and proportionate.76 Moreover, different areas of law use tests that weigh some aspects of proportionality to determine reasonableness of government action or
lack thereof.77 Under the Takings Clause, zoning-permit conditions
must have “rough proportionality” to the effects of the proposed
use of the property.78 Under the Due Process Clause, courts must
ensure that the measure of punitive damages in civil cases “is both
reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff
and to the general damages recovered.”79 Additionally, the “undue
burden” standard in the abortion cases requires reasonable regulations affecting women’s choices to abort their pregnancies.80
Nevertheless, as a comprehensive framework, the doctrine of
proportionality in its entirety is not regularly used by the U.S.
courts.81 The current use of the doctrine is inconsistent and often
cost-benefit focused, which misses a bigger value-based consideration that can equally advance the law’s purpose while intruding less
on rights.82 For example, in Domingo v. Kowalski,83 where a
teacher strapped students with disabilities to toilets and chairs for
76. Jeremy W. Brinster, Comment, Taking Congruence and Proportionality
Seriously, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 580, 583 (2020).
77. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (Am. Law Inst. 1977).
It states:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be considered: (a) existence of a high degree of risk of
some harm to the person, land, or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that
the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the
risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is
not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the
place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
Id.
78. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 606
(2013); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391, 398 (1994).
79. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003). See
generally BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (limiting punitive damages
under the Due Process Clause).
80. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
81. See KAI MOLLER, THE GLOBAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 181
(2012) (“But before engaging in the balancing exercise it is important to establish
that there exists a genuine conflict (suitability) between relevant interests (legitimate goal) which cannot be resolved in a less restrictive way (necessity).”).
82. Mathews & Sweet, supra note 74, at 864; T. Jeremy Gunn, Deconstructing
Proportionality in Limitations Analysis, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 465, 467 (2005)
(“Although aspects of a proportionality analysis resembles a ‘cost-benefit’ analysis,
it is also likely to include a range of other issues, including human rights, federalism, institutional competencies, and the appropriateness of judicial deference to
other institutions.”); see also Gunnarsdóttir et al., supra note 57, at 4 (proposing an
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extended periods of time, the court examined the methods of discipline in isolation from the purpose of discipline.84 The court noted
that purposeless discipline could be proportionate if the disciplinary
method itself was not severe and did not violate the 14th Amendment.85 Put in simpler terms, as long as the measure falls within a
range of reasonable alternatives, it is legitimate. However, in using
the minimal impairment test, the court did not ask whether the use
of any discipline or force without a purpose was legitimate.86 If
courts apply a minimal impairment analysis to resolve specific questions on individual rights, they may fail to see bigger policy implications.87 Constitutional law scholar Vicki Jackson notes, “By going
beyond rationality and minimal impairment, [the doctrine of proportionality can be] more rigorous than U.S. strict scrutiny.”88 The
doctrine addresses interests, values, and principles that other methods of analysis do not address, and it decides what is most importantly at stake by asking whether the amount of force is necessary
to meet the need, rather than comparing it to alternatives.89 If a less
restrictive approach can be imagined, the law should be invalid.90
A possible explanation for why the doctrine of proportionality
has not been used as a theoretical framework in the United States is
that, unlike modern constitutions, the U.S. Constitution does not
have a limitation clause inviting courts to review the justifications
for government actions through a proportionality analysis.91 According to Jackson, U.S. law generally does not discuss rights as
being subject to external limits. Rather, “in the United States,
courts often blend the two ideas—which personal interests a right
protects, and how the government may legitimately act to limit
freedom—and articulate a ‘right’ only after internally accounting
for limitations deemed warranted by the government interests.”92
U.S. courts often combine the question about personal interests and
protected rights with an assessment of whether the government leadditional preliminary procedural balance requiring transparency, objectiveness,
impartiality, and administrative order).
83. Domingo v. Kowalski, 810 F.3d 403, 412 (6th Cir. 2016).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 414 (citing Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th
Cir. 1996)).
86. Emily Suski, The School Civil Rights Vacuum, 66 UCLA L. REV. 720, 735
(2019).
87. See id. at 734.
88. Jackson, supra note 23, at 3116.
89. Id. at 3148.
90. Id. at 3114.
91. Id. at 3122–23.
92. Id. at 3125.
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gitimately limits freedom and articulates the scope of the “right”
accordingly.93 Therefore, when U.S. jurists, lawyers, or scholars say
a “right” has been “infringed,” it is typically the end of the analysis.
Moreover, in the United States, the doctrine of proportionality
is criticized for its flexibility, which detracts from its quality as law
and creates an unacceptable level of indeterminacy.94 A “functional” view relies on the assumption that the roles of the judiciary
and the legislature radically differ. It further assumes that the judiciary would invade legislative functions if it addressed questions
that the legislature has already answered. When using the doctrine,
courts review the process, method, or manner in which a governmental body has reached the decision, but not the decision itself.95
Criticism of the doctrine focuses on the role of judges and on the
position of the law as distinct from politics. Some scholars have severely criticized Step III, proportionality stricto sensu, as consisting
of the personal preferences of judges and allowing for unconstrained moral reasoning, which is perceived as an undemocratic
character of judicial lawmaking.96 For example, Jurgen Habermas
claims that balancing competing values is irrational because it
places incommensurable values on the same scale.97 In such cases,
critics argue that the legal ties of proportionality are too weak to
prevent judges from engaging in policymaking.98 Given this criti93. Id.
94. See, e.g., GRÉGOIRE C.N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON
THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 89–115 (2009); see also Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?, 7 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 468, 470–72 (2009).
95. See, e.g., Coimbatore Dist. Cent. Coop. Bank v. Emps. Assn., 4 SCC 669
(2007) (India).
96. See Francisco J. Urbina, A Critique of Proportionality, 57 AM. J. JURIS. 49,
66 (2012) (discussing proportionality as unconstrained moral reasoning); see also
Frederick Schauer, Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal
Text, in INSTITUTIONALIZED REASON: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ROBERT ALEXY
307, 310 (Matthias Klatt ed., 2012) (“When critics like Habermas accuse the balancing process of being irrational, however, it appears that what they mean is unconstrained.”); PIETER VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 81 (3d ed. 1998) (arguing
that the application of the proportionality test, rather than its theory, is flawed
because it “has not been applied in a uniform manner . . . [and] the Court uses
different variants for different contexts”).
97. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS
TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 253–61 (1996); see also Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting that balancing rights is like trying to decide “whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 972–76 (1987)
(discussing the problem of comparison and the development of a common scale).
98. See Aleinikoff, supra note 97, at 973; Tsakyrakis, supra note 94, at 472–75;
H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and the
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cism, the U.S. Supreme Court should be reluctant to challenge the
justifications of a policy and should maintain that in reviewing legislation, it is not the Court’s function to substitute its views on what is
desirable for that of the legislature.99
Despite these criticisms, some suggest that the doctrine should
be applied to other areas of U.S. constitutional law.100 Supporters
argue that regardless of whether one thinks of judicial review as a
“functional system” or a system of “checks and balances,” proportionality should be part of the review process.101 Functionally, it is
impossible to judge a policy without considering its purpose, reasonableness, specific context, and alternatives. When courts ignore
these considerations, they focus on whether a measurement is “reasonable,” rather than whether the legislative purpose is legitimate
or justified, thus failing to perform their unique role of reviewing
legislation.102 Therefore, for courts to interpret legislative purpose,
they must be “involved in all the difficulties, theoretical and practical, which surround that task.”103 Alternatively, under the “checks
and balances” theory, courts reconsider questions that the legislature has already addressed, which requires that they evaluate proportionality, since the legislature should consider the option that
infringes on rights the least. The proportionality analysis not only
guards the integrity of the legislative process but also respects the
judicial process that reviews it.104 Additionally, because the doctrine of proportionality is used in other liberal, democratic, and
constitutional systems, it can also be applied in the United States,
especially in times of emergency.105 The question of whether the
doctrine of proportionality should be used by courts is beyond the
Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 227–28 (2011) (criticizing the
Court equating “rational basis” as a standard of review with the substance of the
constitutional guarantee).
99. But see Jackson, supra note 23, at 3155 (“Recent experience with categorical rules in the United States suggests that neither determinacy nor respect for
legislative outcomes is necessarily protected through such rules.”).
100. See, e.g., id. at 3096–98; JAMAL GREENE, HOW RIGHTS WENT WRONG:
WHY OUR OBSESSION WITH RIGHTS IS TEARING AMERICA APART (2021); Mathews & Sweet, supra note 74.
101. See, e.g., Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 365–66 (1948).
102. Gunn, supra note 82, at 487 (“In a typical judicial analysis of a limitations
question, the court is called upon to make determinations pertaining to the purpose, intent, and effect of legislation. In short, why did the legislature adopt the
statute, did the statute accomplish its intended effects, and were the effects
beneficial?”).
103. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 101, at 366.
104. Id. at 351.
105. GREENE, supra note 100, at 110.
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scope of this Article. Instead, this Article suggests that the doctrine
should be applied to create a structured emergency policymaking
process within the legislative branch.106
B. Proportionality as Part of Policymaking in Times of
Emergency
Some have suggested expanding the use of proportionality beyond judicial review to legislation and policymaking.107 With this
expansion, we would no longer need to rely on judges, and it would
be beneficial particularly in times of emergency. Applying the doctrine to policymaking bypasses the criticism associated with its application to the judicial process as constituting unconstrained moral
reasoning. The usual legislative mechanisms that evaluate the limitations on, or legitimacy of, government actions are partly suspended or relaxed in times of emergency. The scope of
governmental powers necessary to respond to emergencies cannot
be anticipated and must be adjusted according to specific requirements and challenges posed by the emergencies.108 Therefore, the
government has excessive power to further restrict or infringe fundamental rights and freedoms through its non-legislative agencies.
Absent a clearly defined and alternative legal mechanism to restrict
emergency power, the doctrine of proportionality offers policymakers a clear and workable standard to assess potential policy approaches while adopting more flexible and sensitive reactions to
changing circumstances rather than adopting strict laws. Moreover,
the doctrine of proportionality can improve emergency governance
and create better policymaking by: (1) encouraging public compliance, which is needed to overcome national emergencies; (2) providing accountability; (3) expressing commitment to justice; (4)
committing to democratic values; and (5) detecting possible mistakes in policymaking.
First, proportionality review encourages public compliance by
providing a structured methodology for persuasive reasoning and
evidence. Proportionality review would also show that “government
decisions are driven by . . . respect for individuals’ rights and dignity
as well as for constitutional [and democratic] values.”109 For example, with COVID-19, social distancing, mask wearing, the use of
contact-tracing or symptom-tracing apps, voluntary testing, and
106. Jackson, supra note 23, at 3153–54.
107. See Jackson, supra note 23, at 3097, 3144–47; Mathews & Sweet, supra
note 74, at 804.
108. Gerwin, supra note 45, at 139.
109. Id. at 134–35.
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self-reporting all rely on individual compliance in support of a
larger public interest. A current lack of public compliance with such
recommendations implies that too many restrictions on liberties result in noncompliance.110 In certain contexts, society does not object to a restriction of rights. For example, citizen concerns
encouraged increasing government surveillance following 9/11, with
some citizens even opining that government policies were not going
far enough to protect the nation against terrorism.111 Citizens willingly sacrificed civil liberties and data privacy for the sake of “national security” and felt confident that their rights were protected
by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable surveillance.112 The government can foster similar public trust and compliance in the COVID-19 context by clarifying why limitations on
freedom are necessary to address public health concerns.113 People
are more likely to adhere to policies that limit their liberties and
freedoms if they believe that the government’s actions are necessary and fair.114 In circumstances where government actions collide
with individual rights, the doctrine of proportionality can foster policy that encompasses ethical, political, and economic considerations. Under such a policy, impacted rights can still be exercised to
110. See, e.g., Daisy Fancourt, People Started Breaking Covid Rules When
They Saw Those with Privilege Ignore Them, GUARDIAN (Jan. 2, 2021, 3:00 AM),
https://bit.ly/3zq7fpJ [https://perma.cc/8ALB-RQPP].
111. See John Gramlich, Defending Against Terrorism Has Remained a Top
Policy Priority for Americans Since 9/11, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 11, 2018), https://
pewrsr.ch/3tTCetb [https://perma.cc/BP3H-ZHJ2]; see also Gerwin, supra note 45,
at 144, 145. Gerwin notes:
Although the attacks on 9/11 initiated new debates over the legitimacy of
executive emergency powers derogating individual rights, they did not
fundamentally change the frame of the constitutional discussion . . . . In
most discussions, however, the issue of what constitutes a “legitimate”
emergency remained subsumed within arguments over the constitutionality of certain government emergency responses.
Id.
112. See Daniel Woislaw, How the Fourth Amendment Can Protect Us from
Becoming a Surveillance State, PAC. L. FOUND. (Dec. 23, 2019), https://bit.ly/
39oFvXP [https://perma.cc/AJ4L-RYHN] (noting that the Fourth Amendment
provides protection to citizens as it “prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
of . . . personal possessions such as cell phones, computers, vehicles, and every
other article of moveable property).
113. Jackson, supra note 23, at 3142; Rosie Gray & Caroline Haskins, The
Coronavirus Pandemic Has Set Off a Massive Expansion of Government Surveillance. Civil Libertarians Aren’t Sure What to Do, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 30, 2020,
3:55 PM), https://bit.ly/3lNty42 [https://perma.cc/23VX-W7F7]; Vincent
Manancourt et al., In Fight Against Coronavirus, Governments Embrace Surveillance, POLITICO (Mar. 24, 2020, 1:55 PM), https://politi.co/2Xtldd8 [https://
perma.cc/7FJC-K8W5]; Ross, supra note 51.
114. Gerwin, supra note 45, at 142.
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the greatest possible extent, despite inevitable infringement of
rights.115
Second, proportionality clarifies the justifications for a decision, thereby enhancing a government’s transparency.116 A constitutional democracy’s legitimacy is based on its government being
accountable to the people.117 The burden of justifying an action lies
with the government. In times of emergency, the government may
provide opaque justifications, relying on only a presumption of legality. Proportionality encourages legislative and executive actors
to give justifications for their decisions and explain their preference
for one decision over another. Such action is particularly beneficial
when the available options during emergencies involve closely contested values, colliding rights, and inherent infringements.
Third, a commitment to “Justice” has been associated with proportionality since at least the time of Aristotle.118 Legal systems
that are inconsistent with widely held conceptions of justice undermine people’s respect for law and the legitimacy of public policy
and judicial decisions.119 “Justice is not synonymous with law,”120
meaning a legal action is not necessarily applied justly. However,
there is normative value in a legal system’s aspirations for justice as
it is understood by its society.121 Actions by public authorities that
burden individuals must be understandable, reasonable, and in
alignment with collective judgments on justice and legitimate policy.122 The proportionality doctrine brings law closer to the community’s sense of constitutional justice, highlighting the derogation of
rights, and ensures that options are compared to the best alternatives that are available to policymakers.123 Therefore, when new
threats call for extreme measures, a government can enhance its
115. Gunnarsdóttir et al., supra note 57, at 4.
116. Jackson, supra note 23, at 3142.
117. Id. at 3109.
118. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 162–63 (Sarah Broadie ed., 2002).
119. Jackson, supra note 23, at 3147.
120. Id. at 3147.
121. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 465 (2005) (discussing the concept of public reason).
122. Jackson, supra note 23, at 3146–47.
123. Id. at 3155. For a discussion on justice as a goal of the U.S. Constitution,
see id. at 3106. Jackson notes:
The Constitution’s Preamble states that one of its goals is to “establish
Justice,” . . . . Similarly, there are allusions to proportionality in the Federalist Papers, where the constitutional design is described more generally as aimed to produce “a wise and well-balanced government for a free
people” in a way that will help control “abuses” and avoid the exercise of
“arbitrary and vexatious of powers.”
Id.
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crisis management capability by reaffirming its commitment to fairness and upholding constitutional values.124
Fourth, applying the doctrine to policymaking mirrors a constitutional democracy’s dual commitment to the protection of rights
and to self-governance, a democratic right in itself.125 In times of
emergency, the justification for a government decision must be
more than a matter of administrative interpretation.126 Proportionality may make legislators and other officers more aware of constitutional values. The doctrine of proportionality opens the door for
meaningful participation by all branches of government, encourages
more deliberation over constitutional rights, and leaves room for
democratic debate on the scope of rights and on legitimate infringements under the circumstances.127 By encouraging policies that consider strategies from different perspectives and by advancing
democratic principles within policymaking, proportionality can add
a level of reasonableness to the ongoing process of achieving effective and protective governance.128
Finally, a proportionality-based approach allows for proper
evaluation of the law and for the identification of and response to
deficiencies in governance.129 Disproportionalities, which occur
when a law is more intrusive than necessary, may reveal underlying
problems associated with lawmakers: their disregard for the effects
of their actions on the relatively powerless, their unconscious or
unarticulated prejudices, or their inability to anticipate the effects
of legislation.130 Each of these issues might be understood as the
government’s failure to fulfill its duty of impartiality to the public.
Proportionality allows for more consideration of serious deficiencies in processes that reflect entrenched biases against particular
groups of people. The fact that proportionality is a largely technical,
fact-dependent, neutral, structured, and manageable test is an advantage.131 Its legal-balancing methodology can reveal process fail124. Gerwin, supra note 45, at 170.
125. Jackson, supra note 23, at 3145.
126. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 101, at 352 (“We would expect to find,
therefore, very few cases of legislative classification which can successfully plead
emergency justification, and it may well be held that the initial presumption, in the
case of legislation, should run against the emergency plea.”); see also Johnson,
supra note 38, at 353.
127. Jackson, supra note 23, at 3144.
128. Id. at 3196.
129. Id. at 3142.
130. Id. at 3151.
131. Urbina, supra note 96, at 49; Gertrude Liibbe-Wolff, The Principle of
Proportionality in the Case-law of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 34
HUM. RTS. L.J. 12, 16 (2014) (discussing the importance of “distinguish[ing] the
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ures, including departures from impartial governance, enable
cautious decision making, and help identify criteria legislatures
should abide by in justifying policy.132 Proportionality offers a
structured, systematic methodology rather than an “all-things-considered” balancing test, and it prevents governmental indifference
or blindness to acute harms caused to those who are less able to
protect themselves.133
III.

PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
CASE STUDY

OF

DTA-BASED POLICIES—A

The inherent conflict between the public interest and individual rights in the context of DTAs presents a good opportunity to
apply the doctrine of proportionality. Applying proportionality,
rather than privacy law, provides a more nuanced view of the tradeoffs associated with DTA-based policy. This Article evaluates the
desirability of DTA-based policy by following the three steps in a
proportionality inquiry. The first and second steps assess the suitability and necessity of the means used (the DTAs) to achieve the
desired end. The third step assesses the burden on the individual in
relation to the objective sought to be achieved—in this case: DTAs
impact on users’ rights and freedoms in relation to public health
considerations.
A. Step I—Suitability of DTA-Based Policy
To be considered viable policy, DTAs must be effective. Something is not suitable or necessary if it cannot effectively achieve its
defined purpose. In other words, if DTAs are ineffective, they are
neither suitable nor necessary. At the moment, there is deep moral
and political disagreement about what the goals of DTAs should be.
Proportionality requires policymakers to clearly define such goals,
whether the policy is meant to prevent death,134 infection, an overwhelmed health system,135 or to allow society to flourish even
three levels of the [means] test and applying them in due order”); Tracy A Thomas,
Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Remedies. 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 73, 121 (2007) (“The use of formulas, ratios, and three-factored tests provides
the appearance of objectivity necessary to avoid the caprice of the
decisionmaker.”).
132. Gunnarsdóttir et al., supra note 57, at 3.
133. Jackson, supra note 23, at 3142.
134. See, e.g., Rebecca Klar, Cuomo: It’s Not the Economy or Public Health,
It’s Both, HILL (Mar. 24, 2020, 12:14 PM), https://bit.ly/3tXtGBi [https://perma.cc/
G2Y6-D8RY] (noting that New York Governor Andrew Cuomo stated “The first
order of business is to save lives, period. Whatever it costs.”).
135. Bernstein et al., supra note 24, at 1.
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under a pandemic.136 The goal of “saving lives” may be evaluated
differently than the more concrete goal of contact tracing. Any
goal, however, should be carefully defined and evaluated, and the
tradeoffs it requires should also be considered.137
DTAs further both a narrow and a broad goal.138 The narrow
goal is to alert users about exposure to people diagnosed with
COVID-19 without letting anyone else access the personal information of users. This goal is accomplished by tracing and alerting contacts, and it attempts to imitate traditional contact tracing
conducted by public health authorities. The broad goal is for DTAs
to provide accurate, timely, and complete information for public
health authorities to rely on while handling a crisis. Policies that
further either a narrow or a broad goal may utilize DTAs to minimize long-term general lockdowns, to prevent the social and economic costs posed by lockdown policy, and to minimize the heavy
disruption on daily life posed by COVID-19. Step I reviews the preliminary technical and practical conditions required for DTAs to be
suitable: accurate technology and sufficient availability of COVID19 testing. Suitability evaluates different designs that address technical and practical considerations, and it reveals graded levels of
effectiveness and suitability based on the design. In other words, it
asks: Can DTAs manage to do what they aim to do?
1. Preliminary Technical Conditions
Given the inaccuracy of GPS and Bluetooth-based technologies, it is unclear whether they offer a suitable solution to the problem they aim to solve.139 GPS-based technologies are accurate only
up to a 16-foot radius; they cannot reliably measure distances at
smaller radiuses, including the 6-foot proximity gap that is necessary, according to the CDC, to prevent the spread of COVID-19.140
136. Maggie Haberman & David E. Sanger, Trump Says Coronavirus Cure
Cannot ‘Be Worse than the Problem Itself’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://
nyti.ms/3vWCeJU [https://perma.cc/FKV4-VGBK] (discussing President Trump’s
tweet that “We cannot let the cure be worse than the problem itself”).
137. Gunn, supra note 82, at 491.
138. It should also be noted that there are policies that address intermediate
or combined forms of these goals.
139. E.g., Lokke Moerel, Contact Tracing Apps: Why Tech Solutionism and
Privacy by Design Are Not Enough, IAPP (May 7, 2020), https://bit.ly/2XKm8X9
[https://perma.cc/ETB4-R4FB] (noting that Singapore and Israel had to return to
lockdowns despite using DTAs); David Stavrou, Israel’s Back in Lockdown While
Swedish COVID Deaths Are Plummeting. Here’s Why, HAARETZ (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://bit.ly/3hN9sWc [https://perma.cc/CAD2-P2U4].
140. GPS Accuracy, GPS.GOV, https://bit.ly/3hR5H1Q [https://perma.cc/
YJ26-F2A7] (last visited Oct. 5, 2021); Adam Schwartz & Andrew Crocker, Governments Haven’t Shown Location Surveillance Would Help Contain COVID-19,
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Bluetooth contact-tracing apps, on the other hand, are much more
nuanced and more accurate in measuring proximity than GPSbased technologies.141 Because they can detect proximity through
walls, vehicles, airplanes, and underground transit, the measurements can be misleading.142 For example, the Israeli security agency
Shin Bet ordered a woman into confinement when a contact-tracing
app indicated that she had allegedly been in contact with her
COVID-19-postive partner.143 Though her smartphone accurately
showed her proximity to her partner, in reality, she had been waving at him from outside the building. If such examples render DTAs
unreliable in the public’s opinion, people may refuse to self-isolate
when there are actual risks of infection. Alternatively, the app’s
faulty mandates will result in over-quarantining, which is ineffective.144 Additionally, neither GPS nor Bluetooth systems consider
the precautions taken by individuals in their interactions with
others, such as personal protective equipment (e.g., surgical masks)
that alter an individual’s contagiousness, or the non-human forms
of infection such as infected surfaces, assuming the virus spreads
that way.145
A second preliminary condition for the function of effective
DTAs is the existence of an adequate diagnostic scheme that identifies confirmed COVID cases and traces their contacts. Efficient and
accurate laboratory testing capabilities (testing, testers, and lab
workers) should be available to quickly confirm expanding infecELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 23, 2020), https://bit.ly/2VY1eD5 [https://perma.cc/
9A6E-DKRR].
141. SYDNEY VON ARX ET AL., COVID WATCH, WHITEPAPER: SLOWING THE
SPREAD OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES USING CROWDSOURCED DATA 8 (2020), https://
bit.ly/3nShzEI [https://perma.cc/6SXC-H9XD].
142. Patrick Howell O’Neill, Bluetooth Contact Tracing Needs Bigger, Better
Data, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 22, 2020), https://bit.ly/2XAxiNO [https://perma.cc/
C3L2-9UAQ]; JR Raphael, 6 Make-Or-Break Questions About Google and Apple’s COVID-Tracking Tech, COMPUT. WORLD (Apr. 16, 2020, 9:15 AM), https://
bit.ly/3kq5MeM [https://perma.cc/WS46-68G2].
143. Danielle Groen, How to Lift a Lockdown, WALRUS, https://bit.ly/
3nSjCIQ [https://perma.cc/YXT7-52R9] (Dec. 1, 2020, 12:41 PM).
144. See infra notes 191–92 and accompanying text.
145. Ashkan Soltani et al., Contact-Tracing Apps Are Not a Solution to the
COVID-19 Crisis, BROOKINGS: TECH STREAM (Apr. 27, 2020), https://brook.gs/
3nVHk79 [https://perma.cc/W75P-AQXD]; How COVID-19 Spreads, CDC, https:/
/bit.ly/3tYesMD [https://perma.cc/DYE4-4MHN] (July 14, 2021). See generally
Amanda M. Wilson et al., Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 Infection Risk Within the Apple/Google Exposure Notification Framework to Inform Quarantine Recommendations, 2020 RISK ANALYSIS 1 (arguing that “Bluetooth attenuation is not a reliable
measure of distance, and infection risk is not a binary function of distance, nor
duration, nor timing,” and instead basing the probability of infectiousness on the
number of symptom-free days since exposure and any negative test results).
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tion, whether the goal of the app is to trace people diagnosed with
COVID-19 and their contacts or to find concentrations of infection.146 Because five days of self-isolation is currently required
when individuals test positive for COVID-19 or when they are exposed to someone who tests positive, testing should be processed
quicker to cut the chain of transmission and prevent further exposure.147 Experts have suggested that the United States needs to administer between 500,000148 and 5 million tests per day,149
increasing over time to 20 million tests.150 For the time being, most
of the population is not tested and testing kits are not equally distributed.151 Without equal access to sufficient testing and treatments, some app users may be exposed to infected people who
146. See Ross Anderson, Contact Tracing in the Real World, LIGHT BLUE
TOUCHPAPER (Apr. 12, 2020), https://bit.ly/3B6d3pW [https://perma.cc/SJ8FYKJV]; Re-Opening the Nation: Privacy, Surveillance, and Digital Tools for Contact Tracing, supra note 51; see also Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Authorizes First Diagnostic Test for Screening of People Without Known or Suspected
COVID-19 Infection, FDA (July 24, 2020), https://bit.ly/3tTkGgM [https://
perma.cc/L98E-YLMN] (“Last month, the FDA posted updated templates with
recommendations for test developers to demonstrate validation for a test to be
authorized for screening of asymptomatic people, as well as for sample pooling
. . . . [and] authorized the first COVID-19 test that could be used with pooled
samples.”).
147. See CDC Updates and Shortens Recommended Isolation and Quarantine
Period for General Population, CDC (Dec. 27, 2021), https://bit.ly/3eCkCep
[https:perma.cc/GGG6-ZTGC] (stating that the five-day isolation requirement is
based on what the CDC currently knows about the Omicron variant and COVID19, including that the majority of transmission generally occurs one to two days
before the onset of symptoms and two to three days after).
148. Keith Collins, Coronavirus Testing Needs to Triple Before the US Can
Reopen, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3ks01gC [https://
perma.cc/3MFV-65E4].
149. Dialynn Dwyer, Harvard Researchers Have a Plan to Reopen the Economy Amid COVID-19. But it Would Require a Huge National Effort, BOSTON.COM
(Apr. 27, 2020), https://bit.ly/3CBak8x [https://perma.cc/N6SW-RTD5].
150. Cathy Cosgrove, Privacy Questions for COVID-19 Testing and Health
Monitoring, IAPP (May 13, 2020), https://bit.ly/3EzpOLZ [https://perma.cc/2P4D57BN].
151. Coronavirus (COVID-19) Testing, OUR WORLD IN DATA, https://bit.ly/
3CA5NTN [https://perma.cc/Y3ZV-EUDK] (Oct. 28, 2020). For information on
testing, treatment, and vaccine administration for uninsured people, see FAQs for
Covid-19 Claims Reimbursement to Health Care Providers for Testing, Treatment,
and Vaccine Administration, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., https://bit.ly/
3kra1XC [https://perma.cc/F6VK-QK7Q] (last visited Oct. 5, 2021) (explaining
that the Uninsured Program provides reimbursements “on a rolling basis directly
to eligible providers for claims that are attributed to the testing, treatment, or vaccine administration of COVID-19 for uninsured individuals”); see, e.g., Families
First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020) (allowing states to provide for uninsured individuals’ Medicaid coverage of certain
COVID-19 diagnostic tests and limiting coverage to the test and related services).
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haven’t been tested. Hence, the ability of DTAs to trace and identify concentrations of COVID-19 is limited.
Notwithstanding disagreements regarding the accuracy and effectiveness of public health requirements and technologies, for the
purpose of this Article, I will assume the fulfillment of the two preliminary requirements of suitability: that DTAs can be accurate if
they are further developed and that they can be supported by the
required amount of testing.
2. Design Dependent Suitability
Even if DTA technology is accurate and supported by the required amount of testing, DTA suitability still depends on the design used. Apps can be designed to either collect or avoid collecting
the information of users, including their locations, their COVID-19
statuses, their health information, and any other information contained in user cellphones. Their suitability for achieving either the
goal of cutting the chains of transmission or the goal of improving
public health surveillance is relative.152 Next, this Article analyzes
the tradeoffs for different data-management designs and how those
designs reflect concepts of autonomy and privacy. It posits that the
more the design preserves privacy and autonomy, the more difficult
it is to maintain DTAs’ effectiveness. Suitability is therefore scaled
according to how DTA designs address voluntary use and data
management.
a. Voluntary Versus Mandatory Use
Many apps and phones keep detailed logs of a user’s physical
movements and interactions through automatic GPS tracking (e.g.,
Waze). While such apps offer users the option to opt-in or out of
GPS tracking, most people in Western society (over 70 percent of
152. See generally Patrick Howell O’Neill et al., A Flood of Coronavirus Apps
Are Tracking Us. Now It’s Time to Keep Track of Them, MIT TECH. REV. (May 7,
2020), https://bit.ly/3zrb3qL [https://perma.cc/PAG3-E73P] (comparing 25 significant automated COVID-19 contact-tracing efforts across the world by comparing
what information is gathered; whether the data collection is minimized; whether
there are limitations on the way data is used; whether the data be destroyed or not
after a period of time; and whether there is an effort for transparency, publicly
availability, and open-source code base). See also Stacey Gray, A Closer Look at
Location Data: Privacy and Pandemics, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM (Mar. 25,
2020), https://bit.ly/2Xsrypb [https://perma.cc/S8FJ-BNLB] (discussing ethical and
privacy considerations for collecting location data, including limiting the purpose
for collection).
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the entire U.S. population153) choose to opt-in, regardless of the
current emergency atmosphere due to the pandemic.154 An app that
relies on users’ GPS-location histories can avoid seeking autonomous consent to collect user data and requires little cooperation
from individuals. Mandatory information sharing may increase the
calculus of DTA suitability yet render DTAs less voluntary and user
autonomy questionable. A user’s consent to GPS usage for one app
does not necessarily reflect an autonomous decision to share information for other purposes, such as COVID-19 public health surveillance.155 A design that requires the active download of a DTA
whose explicit purpose is to address COVID-19 could better facilitate specific, informed, and voluntary user consent in accordance
with liberal values.
Voluntary DTA use allows for different rates of adoption that
produce relative levels of effectiveness. During the early stages of
the pandemic, developers argued that in countries where the use of
smartphones is not widespread, 60 percent of smartphone owners
(meaning 56 percent of the population) would have to use the DTA
before it could be deemed effective.156 Later studies measured the
relative effectiveness of using the same DTA based on different
rates of adoption. For example, if 75 percent of the population used
the same app, “it could help reduce deaths by up to 78 percent and
infections by 81 percent.”157 However, “even a 15 [percent] adop153. S. O’Dea, Smartphone Penetration Rate as Share of the Population in the
United States from 2010 to 2021, STATISTA (Apr. 8, 2020), https://bit.ly/39l78Bl
[https://perma.cc/BTX6-UQK6].
154. See generally Crocker, Opsahl & Cyphers, supra note 13. See also Paige
M. Boshell, The Power of Place: Geolocation Tracking and Privacy, BUS. L. TODAY: INTERNET L. & CYBER-SEC. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://bit.ly/3lLQTTq [https://
perma.cc/A8D9-M87G].
155. See, e.g., Olivia Krauth, Your Smartphone Can Be Tracked Even If GPS,
Location Services Are Turned Off, TECHREPUBLIC (Feb. 8, 2018, 7:27 AM), https://
tek.io/3lHnVUS [https://perma.cc/LB3S-G77Z] (noting that in some instances,
GPS locations can be tracked even if all location services and GPS have been
turned off).
156. Digital Contact Tracing Can Slow or Even Stop Coronavirus Transmission and Ease Us Out of Lockdown, UNIV. OF OXFORD (Apr. 16, 2020), https://
bit.ly/3Csk70v [https://perma.cc/73SS-JSRK] (explaining that the Oxford model assumes that no traditional contact tracing was underway and that people over the
age of 70 would remain under lockdown); Kelly Servick, COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps Are Coming to a Phone Near You. How Will We Know Whether They
Work?, SCI. MAG. (May 21, 2020), https://bit.ly/3CqiujM [https://perma.cc/R8WFBDP9]; Tom Abate, Stanford Researchers Help Develop Privacy-Focused
Coronavirus Alert App, STANFORD NEWS (Apr. 9, 2020), https://stanford.io/
3AxmDSw [https://perma.cc/87LR-GLDH].
157. Alejandro de la Garza, People Are Finally Downloading COVID-19 Exposure Notification Apps. Will They Make a Difference?, TIME (Dec. 14, 2020, 3:52
PM), https://bit.ly/3CysAiS [https://perma.cc/3L6F-H6BT]; Patrick Howell O’Neill,
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tion rate can mean 11.8 [percent] fewer deaths and 15 [percent]
fewer infections” (which, over the course of the 300-day model,
could translate into many lives saved).158 Individuals who use DTAs
gain more accurate information on exposure (90 percent app tracing accuracy) compared to individuals who receive information
through non-app tracing methods (50 percent tracing accuracy).159
The higher degree of accuracy should incentivize individuals to use
the DTAs voluntarily. An individual’s informed and autonomous
choice to use the app could also be a reason to assume that the user
will want to comply with reporting and isolation requirements. Partial adoption would still benefit the entire population by decreasing
the spread of infection, provided that DTA users follow self-isolation requirements when alerted to a potential exposure.160
Most public health authorities, universities, and NGOs around
the world support a voluntary design.161 However, for a DTA to be
truly voluntary, there cannot be any informal pressure to use the
app. For example, a design that requires people to use the app as a
condition to work or as a condition to receive government services,
such as unemployment benefits, could not be considered voluntary.162 Evidently, not all smartphone owners are willing to voluntarily adopt such technology.163 So far, in countries where DTA
installation is voluntary, adoption rates have been low.164 In U.S.
Coronavirus Tracing Apps Can Save Lives Even with Low Adoption Rates, MIT
TECH. REV. (Sept. 2, 2020), https://bit.ly/3lGZnLM [https://perma.cc/E4UYQMAP] (“Even at low uptake, it can make significant contributions.”).
158. O’Neill, Coronavirus Tracing Apps Can Save Lives Even with Low
Adoption Rates, supra note 157.
159. VON ARX ET AL., supra note 141, at 5.
160. Canca, supra note 51; Infectious Disease Experts Provide Evidence for a
Coronavirus Mobile App for Instant Contact Tracing, UNIV. OF OXFORD (Mar. 17,
2020), https://bit.ly/3nVMgsH [https://perma.cc/Z84Z-DMKH].
161. See infra Appendix A.
162. Ignacio N. Cofone, Immunity Passports and Contact Tracing Surveillance, 24 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 24 (forthcoming 2021). But see id. at 26 (“Even if
information can be conveyed to users in a way sufficient for consent to be
achieved, and even if the apps are made optional by the government, it is difficult
to ensure that users have a meaningful choice—and the app is not de facto
mandatory.”); id. (“Australia, for example, is considering a draft bill that would
outlaw mandating employees or customers to use the country’s contact tracing
app, called COVIDsafe.”).
163. For a discussion of smartphone-owning populations, see infra Part III.
164. See Craig Timberg et al., Most Americans Are Not Willing or Able to Use
an App Tracking Coronavirus Infections. That’s a Problem for Big Tech’s Plan to
Slow the Pandemic, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2020), https://wapo.st/3hRODsO [https:/
/perma.cc/Y2P9-L8WL] (“Singapore’s TraceTogether app, which launched [in
March], has been downloaded by approximately a fifth of the population. In Australia, more than 2 million people have downloaded the government’s COVIDSafe
app since [release in April]—about 8 percent of the country’s 25 million people.”);
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regions where DTAs have been launched, relatively few people
have downloaded these apps. For example, in Virginia, the first
state to launch an exposure notification app, an estimated 10 to 20
percent of the population downloaded the app.165 Since the beginning of October, approximately five percent of New York residents166 and only one to three percent of residents in Wyoming,
North Dakota, Michigan, Nevada and Alabama, adopted DTAs.167
Even where adoption was considered “rocketing,” only 13 to 28
percent of adoptions contained users’ signatures.168 Moreover, an
opt-in system should include routine check-ins with users to determine whether they want to continue broadcasting, or the system
should include a turn-off option169 that can be utilized at any moment to reflect a user’s continuous consent. When the app’s tracing
is turned off, it cannot function, and its benefit is suspended.
Society’s willingness to use the technology is not enough, however. As DTAs grow in variety, individual DTAs become less effective because each app tracks smaller portions of the population and
operates with different time and proximity criteria. For example,
Bluetooth signals from Android and Apple phones cannot easily
connect to one another.170 Interoperability between different apps
see also Servick, supra note 156 (“Singapore, which pioneered app-based contact
tracing with its launch of TraceTogether on [March 20, 2021], reports more than 1.4
million users—roughly one-quarter of the country.”).
165. Rich Griset, Virginia Leads Nation in COVID-19 App Use, VA. BUS.
(Dec. 11, 2020), https://bit.ly/3lMIEqn [https://perma.cc/P5T5-E5MD].
166. Gwynne Hogan, Governor Cuomo Said the State’s COVID App Could
“Make a Big Difference”—Did It?, GOTHAMIST (Dec. 3, 2020, 2:07 PM), https://
bit.ly/2XBikaN [https://perma.cc/YN5K-RQP6]. For a discussion on how the
COVID-19 pandemic has impacted people’s mental health, see Nirmita Panchal et
al., The Implications of COVID-19 for Mental Health and Substance Use, KFF
(Feb. 10, 2021), https://bit.ly/3Fc9kcg [https://perma.cc/F5RB-5P74].
167. Nicole Wetsman, Contact Tracing Apps Promised Big and Didn’t Deliver,
VERGE (Dec. 11, 2020, 10:52 AM), https://bit.ly/2Zg2XVA [https://perma.cc/5YJFRTFS]; Bryan Anderson & Matt O’Brien, Despite Promise, Few in US Adopting
COVID-19 Exposure Apps, AP NEWS (Dec. 6, 2020), https://bit.ly/3Bp2a21.
168. See de la Garza, supra note 157 (indicating that 28% of adoptions in
Colorado, 20% in Connecticut, 17% in Washington, and 13% in California contained user signatures).
169. See, e.g., Davey Winder, How to Disable Apple and Google’s COVID-19
Notifications on Your Phone, FORBES (June 28, 2020, 8:59 AM), https://bit.ly/3iiQmYg [https://perma.cc/LS3X-FAZP].
170. Jules Polonetsky, Will I Install an Exposure Notification App? Thoughts
on the Apple-Google API, LINKEDIN (May 20, 2020), https://bit.ly/2Z7fytY [https://
perma.cc/XZ6V-K59H]. But see, e.g., Kylie Foy, Bluetooth Signals from Your
Smartphone Could Automate COVID-19 Contact Tracing While Preserving Privacy, MIT NEWS (Apr. 8, 2020), https://bit.ly/3CAG5yt [https://perma.cc/WAS5DQX7] (reporting that engineers have achieved interoperability at the prototype
phase).
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is needed to trace alarming exposures. However, commercial interests may drive companies to achieve wide, exclusive adoption rates
and earn the largest market share. To increase the effectiveness of
DTA-based policy, governments can intervene and pass regulations
that require interoperability.
Therefore, the more we respect a person’s autonomous choice
to download a DTA, the more we compromise the effectiveness of
the app. Several scholars argued that maintaining a free flow of information is an ethical requirement during public health crises, and
therefore, the ethically desirable option is to mandate DTA use.171
They argue that if data security is guaranteed and users can trust
that DTAs will not disclose their private information, then there is a
moral duty for authorities to mandate DTA use for the sake of public interest.172 Mandated use signals a need for public compliance.173 For these and other reasons, some countries have decided
not to promote voluntary use.174 The importance of data privacy is
therefore undeniable.175 If mandatory, DTAs should secure the privacy of user information to minimize the violation of civil rights. If
DTAs are consent-based, privacy of sensitive personal information
is essential to improve user trust and usage.176 Without assurances
171. See Ross, supra note 51. According to Michelle Mello, a health law professor at Stanford University, “There are times that not using the information that
we have is morally hard to defend, and I think this is one of them.” Id.; see also
Canca, supra note 51 (arguing that population-wide mandatory use of DTAs that
contain privacy preserving designs can be more efficient and more respective of
privacy than traditional contact tracing or lockdowns and is therefore the only ethical option for fighting COVID-19.).
172. See Ross, supra note 51; Canca, supra note 51.
173. See Fancourt, supra note 110.
174. Dave Gershgorn, We Mapped How the Coronavirus Is Driving New Surveillance Programs Around the World, ONEZERO (Apr. 9, 2020), https://bit.ly/
3nSCszS [https://perma.cc/Z5RX-6AHP] (“[I]n Argentina . . . those who are
caught breaking quarantine are being forced to download an app that tracks their
location. In Hong Kong, those arriving in the airport are given electronic tracking
bracelets that must be synced to their home location through their smartphone’s
GPS signal.”); Isobel Asher Hamilton, Poland Made an App That Forces
Coronavirus Patients to Take Regular Selfies to Prove They’re Indoors or Face a
Police Visit, INSIDER (Mar. 23, 2020, 8:06 AM), https://bit.ly/3nP01cz [https://
perma.cc/69JE-GX3F] (“In Poland, citizens under quarantine had to download a
government app that mandated they respond to periodic requests for selfies.”); Tal
Schneider, Israeli Cabinet Unanimously Approves Phone-Tracking App Bill,
GLOBES (June 24, 2020, 5:56 PM), https://bit.ly/3tYamEn [https://perma.cc/UG4YYK69].
175. It could be argued that when citizens voluntarily choose to use an app
independent from any governmental pressure, they are free to use a proportionate
or disproportionate app. However, this choice will neither prevent potential privacy harms to those citizens nor avoid the consequential implications to society.
176. See Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll—Late April 2020:
Coronavirus, Social Distancing, and Contact Tracing, KFF (Apr. 24, 2020), https://
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of privacy, people will be unlikely to trust DTAs enough to adopt
their technologies.
Regardless of whether users accept mandatory DTAs, they do
not have control over how and in what way their information is
shared. Developers determine how information is transferred,
which varies with each DTA design. The next part of this Article
reviews possible data-management designs and their implications
on the suitability of DTAs in light of privacy-preserving recommendations.177 In particular, it addresses the types of information collected by DTAs and whether it is appropriate for DTAs to restrict
access to such information by public health authorities and other
stakeholders.
b. Managing Sensitive Information
Several key questions regarding recommended DTA designs
that preserve privacy may be relevant to suitability. How should the
design prevent excessive use of information? Which types of information should be collected—identifying or non-identifying? How
should this data be processed and stored? What will the information be used for? Should different types of data or databases be
cross-referenced? And who should get access to the data?
Contact tracing requires information on who was close enough
to people diagnosed with COVID-19. This information can be discovered by collecting geolocation data through GPS or Bluetooth
technology. GPS-based apps connect to specific phones and users,
reveal their whereabouts at any given moment, and impose great
privacy violations.178 DTAs can preserve more privacy if they
anonymize this proximity information.179 Yet, anonymization alone
is not enough to secure privacy. Moreover, individual anonymized
bit.ly/3zorrYV [https://perma.cc/VA3G-R5AK] (reporting that privacy was a major
consideration for polled app users and that fewer than three in ten were willing to
use an app if there was a “chance that data from the app could be hacked”); YvesAlexandre de Montjoye et al., Evaluating COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps? Here
Are Eight Privacy Questions We Think You Should Ask., COMPUTATIONAL PRIV.
GRP. (Apr. 2, 2020), https://bit.ly/2ZcZyGV [https://perma.cc/LD42-LFRX] (offering questions for those with privacy concerns to ask when evaluating prospective
contact-tracing apps). Without implementing specific measures to mitigate the
public’s fear of being identified by the authorities and others, many will refuse to
use DTAs voluntarily.
177. See infra Appendix A.
178. See Brooke Crothers, Coronavirus Tracing Apps Could Be Used by
Hackers to Access Your Personal Data, Report Says, FOX NEWS (June 12, 2020),
https://fxn.ws/3kpWakg [https://perma.cc/YH83-P93Q].
179. See also Guide to the Ethics of Surveillance and Quarantine for Novel
Coronavirus, NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, https://bit.ly/3CvVRKT [https://
perma.cc/PBD9-B6G3] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021) (“To assess and predict trends in
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information does not really preserve privacy because many inferences can be drawn from the locations that users visit. It takes very
little to fully identify who users are and what they do.180 For example, location history can identify a user’s home and work addresses
or places and people visited, including health centers, immigration
or criminal lawyers, immigration clinics, meetings to plan protests,
and meetings with psychiatrists, and doctors. This tracking may be
the reason why most GPS-based information is used in an aggregated, anonymized form rather than in an individualized form.181
DTAs using aggregated data combine the location trails of
many anonymous users to reveal statistical patterns, thus imposing
fewer privacy risks.182 While use of aggregated data can be suitable
for policy design purposes, this goal is different from the goal of
contact tracing. For example, Google developed the COVID-19
Community Mobility Reports, open to the public and policymakers,
which contains aggregated, anonymized sets of data from users who
turned on their Location History setting.183 The reports show users’
mobility patterns and provide insight into how society changed in
response to policies aimed at combating COVID-19. In Israel, for
example, COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports helped the Mininfectious disease[,] it is acceptable for anonymi[z]ed data to be collected and used
without consent, as long as any invasion of privacy is reduced as far as possible.”).
180. See Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Twelve Million Phones, One
Dataset, Zero Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://nyti.ms/3tZXjlu [https://
perma.cc/VS5A-D6V6].
181. See Martin Untersinger, Europe Requests Data from Telephone Operators to Assess the Effect of Containment Measures, ARCHYDE (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://bit.ly/3hV4arT [https://perma.cc/G4BK-YVJN] (reporting that the European Commission asked mobile phone providers to access aggregated user data
“to better understand and anticipate” the evolution of the pandemic); Natasha Lomas, What Are the Rules Wrapping Privacy During COVID-19?, TECHCRUNCH
(Mar. 20, 2020, 1:37 PM), https://tcrn.ch/3hSgF7E [https://perma.cc/D6DW-2JAP]
(reporting that in Germany, the United Kingdom, and other European jurisdictions, “anonymized mobile phone data has been handed over to organizations” for
analysis).
182. But see Melissa Gymrek et al., Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname
Inference, 339 SCI. 321, 321 (2013) (showing how “a combination of a surname with
other types of metadata, such as age and state,” can identify anonymized genetic
data, relying “on free, publicly accessible Internet resources”).
183. COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports, GOOGLE, https://bit.ly/
39mHz2P [https://perma.cc/RTK4-QEM5] (last visited Oct. 30, 2021). This platform provides reports of “movement trends over time by geography, [and] across
different categories of places[,] such as retail and recreation, groceries and pharmacies, parks, transit stations, workplaces, and residential” areas. Id. The reports
consist of data per country, with 131 countries covered initially, or per state, further broken down into regions and counties—with Google offering an analysis of
how community mobility has changed, compared to a baseline average before
COVID-19. Id.; see Lomas, Google Is Now Publishing Coronavirus Mobility Reports, supra note 10.
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istry of Finance assess the rate of unemployment due to the pandemic by comparing data on the presence of phones in workplaces
before and during the Coronavirus, but the assessment has limited
validity due to the rise in remote work.184 Thus, aggregated data
could assist policymakers in designing response policies and restrictions targeting specific populations. However, once aggregated, information is unsuitable for the purpose of contact tracing. Since the
data is not individualized, an app could not detect if someone was
exposed to a person diagnosed with COVID-19.
Bluetooth-based apps can preserve user privacy better than
GPS-based apps because with Bluetooth, a DTA’s historical data
logs may collect location information but does not need to. DTAs
can avoid accessing a user’s location data and/or their
phone’s contact list, thus preventing Bluetooth communications
from being tied to a user’s identity.185 A Bluetooth-based DTA
would need to be programmed to detect only whether users are
close enough to one another to create a risk of infection. The app’s
server can gain access to anonymous user identifiers and send
messages to every user that matches a specific event log number, all
without infringing on user privacy.186 The app can be fully functional with minimal collection, storage, or transmission of private
information.187 Less intrusive but still beneficial, most recommendations prefer DTAs that use Bluetooth over GPS. However, the
benefits of an encrypted event log are limited unless they cross-reference user information with their health information, such as their
COVID-19 status.188 The collection of COVID-19 statuses can be
184. Amit Chagay, What Did Your Smartphone Do in Azrieli Mall on Sunday
Morning?, MARKER (June 24, 2020), https://bit.ly/3tX2dQp [https://perma.cc/
Y8QW-FWGD] (Isr.).
185. See Crocker, Opsahl & Cyphers, supra note 13.
186. See VON ARX ET AL., supra note 141, at 5. But see Soltani et al., supra
note 145 (arguing that because these contact tracing systems “reveal health status
in connection with a unique . . . identifier” (if rotating, meaning, changing identifiers for a single user, to minimize potential identification), “it is possible to correlate infected people with their pictures using a stationary camera connected to
a Bluetooth device in a public place”).
187. But see Cofone, supra note 162, at 202 n.132 (highlighting one experiment that placed several Bluetooth devices at different locations of a city by tracking proximity, not location, to show that a linkage attack on them enables
reidentification and profiling).
188. See, e.g., Costica Dumbrava, Tracking Mobile Devices to Fight
Coronavirus, at 7, EUR. PARL. RSCH. SERV. (Apr. 2020), https://bit.ly/3nT9EqJ
[https://perma.cc/MWQ2-ZAJG] (citing a study of the 2014 west African Ebola
crisis that “questioned the effectiveness of location tracking in tackling epidemics,
arguing that location data [is] most useful when cross-referenced with other data
(e.g.[,] testing and diagnostics data)”).
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designed in either a centralized form or a decentralized form.189 A
centralized design requires one or more authorities, usually governmental, to confirm that an individual is indeed infected and to alert
relevant contacts. A decentralized design requires deciding if and to
what extent public health authorities would insert information into
the system and/or alert other users. Public health authorities may
interfere in two scenarios: when reporting a diagnosed user to alert
the DTA system and when alerting other users that they have been
exposed to a person diagnosed with COVID-19.
When reporting confirmed cases in a centralized DTA design,
health authorities can confirm a user’s COVID-19 status and update their diagnosis in the system.190 However, in decentralized
apps that require self-reporting, people who are diagnosed with
COVID-19 must autonomously update their status to an encrypted
database. A decentralized reporting design can impede a DTA’s
suitability. Self-reporting may result in significant numbers of mistaken or malicious reports by healthy users that they are diagnosed
with COVID-19.191 False reporting increases panic and burden
among users who undergo unnecessary self-isolation and decreases
a user’s trust in and compliance with DTAs.192 Yet, a decentralized
DTA may still be suitable, even with false-positive reporting in the
sense that even if it over alerts, people who have been exposed will
be notified and could self-isolate. Although suitable, it is ineffective
because it encourages isolation for those who do not need to isolate. With time, many people could disregard alerts altogether.
Some suggest a middle approach where public health authorities confirm a diagnosis and make sure that reporting is based on
actual test results updated in the public health system.193 After confirming that a diagnosis is not a false report, public health authori189. Jessica Morley et al., Ethical Guidelines for COVID-19 Tracing Apps,
582 NATURE 29, 31 (2020); see Cofone, supra note 162, at 183 (“Some refer to
decentralized apps as ‘exposure notification apps’ and reserve the term ‘contact
tracing apps’ for centralized apps.”). Australia and Singapore are examples of
countries that use centralized forms to collect COVID-19 statuses, and Germany
and Italy are examples of countries that use decentralized forms.
190. See Morley et al., supra note 189, at 31; Canca, supra note 51; Crocker,
Opsahl & Cyphers, supra note 13.
191. Soltani et al., supra note 145; Crocker, Opsahl, & Cyphers, supra note 13.
192. Soltani et al., supra note 145 (“Individuals living in densely populated
neighborhoods and apartment buildings—characteristics that are also correlated to
non-white and lower income communities—are likelier to experience incidences of
false positives due their close proximity to one another.”).
193. See Casey Newton, Apple and Google Answer Our Questions, INTERFACE WITH CASEY NEWTON (Apr. 13, 2020), https://bit.ly/2VZFeYv [https://
perma.cc/23EQ-BDMX]; Nicole Wetsman, Apple and Google’s COVID-19 Tracking System Will Make Its Full U.S. Debut in New Virginia App, VERGE (Aug. 5,
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ties give the diagnosed user a one-time anonymous code to
maintain the user’s privacy, which the user then inserts into the app
to begin alerting others. If the only goal of DTA-based policy is to
alert users about exposure, authorities can encrypt the data so that
the only interaction users have with it is when reporting a positive
test result.
Public health authorities may also have access to a DTA user’s
personal information when alerting contacts who are exposed to a
diagnosed user. In a decentralized design, lists of log numbers are
stored on the users’ own devices, rather than on servers run by the
DTA developer or by public health authorities so that only the user
is notified that they were exposed (peer-to-peer).194 For example,
when user A sits within 6 feet of user B for longer than 15 minutes,
A’s DTA logs the contact with B, and B’s DTA logs the contact
with A. If user A reports a positive COVID-19 diagnosis, user B
will receive a direct alert. The practice of public health authorities
alerting contacts may be more suitable, but increased third-party
exposure to user information may make DTAs more prone to data
breaches and leaks.
The type of information contained in an alert is also important.
Whether alerts are sent in a centralized or decentralized way, the
scope of the diagnosed user’s data released to exposed contacts is
unclear.195 As a default, in traditional contact tracing, the decision
of how much data to share is left to local health departments, which
tend to respect confidentiality as much as possible. They usually do
not inform contacts of the diagnosed patient’s name196 and almost
never provide general information about a person’s employment,
the links between infected individuals, or the onset of symptoms.197
While arguably useful, the release of exact information could result
in harmful consequences to diagnosed users, such as others stigmatizing them as being reckless or careless in taking precautions. This
stigma is especially problematic if DTAs are not 100 percent accu2020, 12:04 PM), https://bit.ly/3lOG2bx [https://perma.cc/CE2S-XX5Y] (reporting
on the debut of Virginia’s COVIDWISE app).
194. See Crocker, Opsahl & Cyphers, supra note 13.
195. See Cosgrove, supra note 150 (“First responders are being given the addresses of people who have tested positive for COVID-19.”).
196. Cohen et al., infra note 223, at 2371. However, even if public health authorities do not reveal the identity of the diagnosed patient, those informed can
somtimes infer the identity. Id.
197. Christian Sheckler, Details on Coronavirus Cases Are Often Scant as
Health Officials Point to Privacy Laws, S. BEND TRIB. (Apr. 4, 2020, 5:00 PM),
https://bit.ly/3ku3z28 [https://perma.cc/W732-Y8BW].
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rate.198 For example, in the Philippines, the Mayor of the Municipality of Lambunao requested the consent of diagnosed individuals
to publish their names and ease contact-tracing efforts.199 As a result, the diagnosed individuals were identified and their residences
were attacked by unknown individuals.200 If such incidents became
common, people would be reluctant to report their COVID-19 status, which would compromise DTA suitability. On the other hand,
we may wish to hide a user’s identifying details but disclose those
details about alleged encounters, thereby allowing users to appeal
alerts based on inaccurate DTA assessments requiring their self-isolation. Allowing such appeals is necessary given the evidence of inaccurate exposure alerts and the severe deprivation of the freedom
of movement due to the required self-isolation following such
alerts.201
A decentralized design provides limited benefits to the broad
goal of public health administration since public health authorities
cannot benefit from real-time information and assess adjust their
policies accordingly.202 Privacy-preserving designs minimize the information that can be extracted from DTAs.203 However, a regulation that pairs decentralized collection with mandatory reporting by
collectors could create a centralized system of information needed
for policymaking.204 For example, the Department of Health and
198. Compare Max S. Kim, Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact
Tracing, NEW YORKER (Apr. 17, 2020), https://bit.ly/3CvGJ02 [https://perma.cc/
4A2H-KVHK] (addressing the fear of social stigmatization and other reflections
on conflicting interests), with Sabrina Tavernise & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Spit on,
Yelled at, Attacked: Chinese-Americans Fear for Their Safety, N.Y. TIMES, https://
nyti.ms/3hOo87B [https://perma.cc/BQ8W-PCVY] (May 5, 2021) (reporting on the
stigmatization of Asians in the United States because of COVID).
199. Tara Yap, Stoning of Residence of Family Being Ravaged by COVID-19
Condemned, MANILA BULL. (Apr. 5, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2WyObYU.
200. Id.
201. See Omar Kabir, To Be Released from Isolation: Sixty Percent of the Appeals Against GPS Location Were Found to Be Justified, CALCALIST (July 14, 2020,
12:04 PM), https://bit.ly/39pzsT0 [https://perma.cc/H9F6-G2YB] (Isr.).
202. See infra Part III.C.3. While a decentralized design reveals the notification only to the relevant users in a manner that preserves their privacy, it is unclear
why designs should avoid giving public health authorities access to confirmed
COVID-19 information. To decide the amount of respect given to users’ privacy,
the criterion of comparison should not be digital privacy-preserving designs in normal times, but rather proportionate legal privacy exceptions during a pandemic,
when traditional contact tracing is taking place.
203. See Tauvod, Can We Stop the Spread of the Pandemic and Maintain Privacy?, YOUTUBE, at 1:38:00 (July 28, 2020), https://bit.ly/2W76xA8 [https://
perma.cc/JS4V-BP22] (Isr.) (mentioning that countries that adopt Google and Apple’s privacy-preserving design lose options to control the pandemic).
204. See Anderson, supra note 146. Given the novelty of the disease, some
jurisdictions have passed emergency laws mandating the reporting of confirmed
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Human Services (HHS) specifically allows broad data sharing to
promote “key public goals such as research, public health, and law
enforcement.”205 Sharing information with public health authorities
may be a justified exception to privacy safeguards.
c. Who Else Gets Access?
Privacy-preserving designs aim to minimize access by groups
other than public health authorities, such as law enforcement, employers, or foreign governments. Nevertheless, the pandemic may
require counterintuitive decisions regarding data sharing that may
expose details to such groups. Sharing personal information with
these other entities is uncommon in regular times. However, during
a pandemic, many of those entities may need to access personal
information to protect the public interest. Restricting access to such
information would make DTAs less effective in cutting chains of
transmission or even endanger others.
Normally, when public health authorities have access to personal health information, that information must not be used for
other purposes, including the enforcement of criminal or immigration laws.206 But, for purposes of enforcing isolation during a pandemic, HHS’s Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Information (“Privacy Rule”) allows law enforcement authorities to access information on people diagnosed with COVID19.207 Additionally, some information can be shared with governmental agencies and health researchers.208 Once the information is
COVID-19 cases. See Surveillance Case Definitions for Current and Historical Conditions, CDC: NAT’L NOTIFIABLE DISEASES SURVEILLANCE SYS., https://bit.ly/
3lKQIrB [https://perma.cc/EBS4-43BJ] (Apr. 16, 2021) (providing that in the US,
under emergency public health policy, COVID-19 is a notifiable disease, so health
care providers who diagnose confirmed cases must inform public health authorities); Jennifer Baker, Pandemic Incites Concerns About Data-Sharing Overreach,
IAPP (Mar. 24, 2020), https://bit.ly/3hTNoJE [https://perma.cc/RKG3-H823] (reporting that Italy passed emergency legislation requiring “people in certain transmission risk categories to notify health authorities”); Lomas, What Are the Rules
Wrapping Privacy During COVID-19?, supra note 181 (reporting on a coronavirus
notification regulation in Germany); Coronavirus (COVID-19) Listed as a Notifiable Disease, GOV.UK (Mar. 5, 2020), https://bit.ly/3tZWl95 [https://perma.cc/
29MF-V6PY] (reporting that the United Kingdom added COVID-19 to its list of
notifiable diseases).
205. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. 59,918, 59,923 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts.
160, 164).
206. Schwartz, supra note 40.
207. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2021).
208. McDonald, supra note 41; Kharpal, supra note 38; see Liz Landers, Alabama and Massachusetts Are Handing the Addresses of People with Coronavirus
Over to Police, VICE NEWS (Mar. 31, 2020, 3:20 PM), https://bit.ly/3tWE4JR
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entered into a law enforcement database, often without a restriction
on the purpose of use, it can be used for any other future purpose.209 Traditionally, “disproportionate profiling, policing, and
criminalization” have burdened vulnerable subpopulations more
than others.210 Governmental authorities should be fully transparent about what COVID-related data they acquire, the source of the
data, how that data is being used, and who gets future access. At the
time of this writing, most countries around the world have not adhered to these principles.
Additionally, sharing COVID-19 statuses or social-association
histories can facilitate employment discrimination.211 Employers
may have financial interests to discriminate against people, such as
switching employee insurance policies to save money or refusing to
hire certain people whose health histories signal potential future
costs.212 Sharing genetic information has traditionally raised similar
concerns about employment and insurance discrimination and is
[https://perma.cc/344N-ZSVX]. “Two U.S. states—Alabama and Massachusetts—
have begun providing the addresses”—but not the names—“of those known to
have been diagnosed with COVID-19 to police” and other emergency responders
“in a bid to contain the spread and protect first responders who might answer a call
where a coronavirus sufferer is involved.” Id. In Alabama, “[t]he information is
being distributed to 85 emergency communications districts in the state, and is then
relayed to police officers and other first responders when they go out on calls.” Id.;
see also Baker, supra note 204. (“In New Zealand, Privacy Commissioner John
Edwards said, ‘It will not be a breach of the Privacy Act for any accommodation
provider or tourism operator to notify a medical officer or police officer of someone noncompliant with self-isolation obligations.’ ”).
209. Natalie Ram & David Gray, Mass Surveillance in the Age of COVID-19,
7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 15–16 (2020); see also Graham Greenleaf & Katharine
Kemp, Police Access to COVID Check-in Data Is an Affront to Our Privacy. We
Need Stronger and More Consistent Rules in Place, CONVERSATION (Sept. 7, 2021,
2:00 AM), https://bit.ly/3lP2BNn [https://perma.cc/GG2Z-SBE4] (reporting that
Australian police have used COVID check-in data “on at least six occasions for
unrelated criminal investigations”).
210. Tereza Hendl et al., Pandemic Surveillance and Racialized Subpopulations: Mitigating Vulnerabilities in COVID-19 Apps, 17 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY
829, 829–30 (2020).
211. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir.
1980) (explaining that “an employee’s medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to
privacy protection”).
212. See Ann Reilly Dowd, Protect Your Privacy: A Money Investigation
Reveals the Five Biggest Threats to Your Privacy and How You Can Safeguard
Yourself Against the Most Serious Types of Snooping., CNN MONEY (Aug. 1,
1997), https://cnn.it/3ieNdcb [https://perma.cc/8XZY-3YXL] (reporting that in
studying “the privacy practices of 300 Fortune-500 companies,” University of Illinois Professor David Linowes found that “35 percent of employers said they use
personal medical information as a basis for hiring, promotion, and firing
decisions”).
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thus protected by statutory law and corresponding regulations.213
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008
restricts the access of employers and health-insurers to statutorilycovered genetic information that could result in harmful consequences, and bans the disclosure and discriminatory misuse of such
information.214 To prevent COVID-19 discrimination, a policy
could apply anti-discrimination laws similar to GINA and others to
minimize the misuse of COVID-19-related information.215 However, a public health emergency may pose practical difficulties on
restricting employers’ access to such information.216 During a pandemic, some information about an employee’s health status should
be shared with an employer to allow the employer to take preventive measures necessary for safety in the workplace.217 According to
213. Such information could be an incidental collection, commercially purchased, or publicly available. Employers can use data to identify markers that may
affect a person’s employment, such as a disease that will require sick days or other
genetic dispositions. See Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons
from the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 437,
466–67 (2010) (discussing legislative history that demonstrates Congress’s intent to
address genetic-information discrimination even while acknowledging it was not
widespread); Health Insurance in the Age of Genetics, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH.
INST., https://bit.ly/3nWQJvo [https://perma.cc/6GPU-DV4E] (Apr. 12, 2011).
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff–1(b)(5)(B)(i). Misuse could happen once employers or health insurers legally obtain genetic information. Since these institutions
have a lot to gain from accessing genetic information, in an attempt to balance
power relations, health insurers and employers are prohibited from purchasing genetic information from third parties. Insurers cannot request, require, or purchase
genetic information of a potential or current employee, or their family members, in
order to consider genetic dispositions. They also cannot obtain this information to
determine a preexisting condition as a condition for one’s eligibility for health insurance or to make decisions about premiums, coverage, or other payments. Similarly, employers with 15 or more employees cannot use family health history or
genetic test results in making decisions about employment (hiring, firing, promotion, pay, or terms), or regarding the way they treat employees in the workplace
(they cannot limit, segregate, classify, or otherwise mistreat employees). See id.
(providing statutory requirements and prohibitions at various sections).
215. For a set of ethical values that should be considered when implementing
disease surveillance technology in response to a pandemic, see Hendl et al., supra
note 210.
216. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)(5)(B)(ii) (providing that if federal or state law
requires the genetic monitoring, the employer does not need authorization).
217. See Baker, supra note 204; W. Nicholson Price II & I. Glenn Cohen,
Privacy in the Age of Medical Big Data, 25 NATURE MED. 37, 41 (2019) (providing
the definition of disclosure under the Privacy Rule and that it is enough that a
third party has access to PHI available for review, regardless of whether the third
party actually reviews any particular record); see also Angela Chen, Why It’s Time
to Rethink the Laws That Keep Our Health Data Private, VERGE (Jan. 29, 2019,
8:30 AM), https://bit.ly/3kuI4xT [https://perma.cc/8XEU-KV6R]. Health insurance
would also inevitably be exposed to individuals’ wider health information when
they seek care for COVID-19. Insurance companies may refuse to sell insurance to
those who suffered from COVID-19 complications, and long-term insurers could
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HHS’s Privacy Rule, covered entities may disclose protected health
information to an employer regarding an employee, upon the former’s request, to meet the employer’s obligation to protect the
safety of other workers.218 Additionally, employers must maintain
safe working environments under Occupational Safety and Health
Administration regulations,219 Mine Safety and Health Administration regulations,220 and similar state laws; that responsibility might
require employers to know which employees risk exposing others to
COVID-19. Therefore, DTAs that are designed not to share such
information with employers would be less suitable for the purpose
of protecting public health.
Finally, one goal of the WHO is to create a global surveillance
network that monitors trends of human infection and provides early
warning of new strains in humans and animals.221 DTAs can either
provide information for such a network under the broad goal of
supplying data to public health authorities or avoid doing so under
a narrow goal of alerting only infected individuals. The narrow goal
is not necessarily preferable. In the United States, the HHS invests
resources into international surveillance and response to assist
other countries in the early detection of an influenza outbreak and
to minimize and contain the impact of a pandemic, should one occur.222 DTAs that are designed to provide information would be
more beneficial to the global network than apps that are designed
to keep information confidential, since Sars-Cov-2 could require
global surveillance activities given its ability to emerge anywhere in
the world. DTAs that share information for such a purpose would
be more suitable to promote broader public health purposes.
To conclude, different DTA designs vary in their levels of autonomy, privacy, effectiveness, and thus their suitability. The U.S.
“federal government has yet to announce a nationwide [DTA] policy.”223 The collection of complete and accurate information may
use the information to increase insurance premiums. Id. However, insurance companies are covered entities according to HIPAA and are subjected to the Privacy
Rule. Id.
218. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (2021).
219. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678.
220. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–804,
811–826, 841–846, 861–878, 901–945, 951–966.
221. WHO Global Surveillance and Monitoring System, WHO, https://bit.ly/
2Y127vv [https://perma.cc/GV9W-NDYX] (last visited Oct. 30, 2021).
222. Office of Global Affairs, Office of Pandemics and Emerging Threats
(PET), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://bit.ly/2ZaWJ9i [https://
perma.cc/FFP8-42G8] (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
223. I. Glenn Cohen et al., Digital Smartphone Tracking for COVID-19: Public Health and Civil Liberties in Tension, 323 JAMA 2371, 2372 (2020).
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depend on whether the app aims to address a broad or narrow goal.
In accordance with privacy-preserving objectives, some DTAs are
designed with a degree of security and privacy in mind. But, many
DTAs around the world do not adopt privacy-preserving principles,224 which is unsurprising considering the implications of privacy-preserving designs on DTA effectiveness and suitability. There
are some non-voluntary uses of DTAs as well as GPS-based
DTAs.225 The scope and use of collected information could theoretically be minimal, but in reality, many apps are designed to collect
excessive amounts of information.226 Some apps cross-reference
smartphone location data with other types of data, including credit
card records, airline databases, surveillance-camera footage, or
health information.227 Cross-referencing data is extremely worrisome because it often exposes private aspects of people’s lives beyond what is required for public health purposes.228 Additionally,
224. For the inconsistency between DTAs, see, e.g., O’Neill et al., supra note
152 (“[T]here was no central repository of information; just incomplete, constantly
changing data spread across a wide range of sources. Nor was there a single, standard approach being taken by developers and policymakers: citizens of different
countries were seeing radically different levels of surveillance and transparency”);
Gershgorn, supra note 174 (stating that the website OneZero has been compiling
press reports from 34 countries, with potential privacy issues, that are ramping up
surveillance to combat the coronavirus); Samuel Woodhams, COVID-19 Digital
Rights Tracker, TOP10VPN (Mar. 20, 2021), https://bit.ly/3Cy7913 [https://
perma.cc/VP5U-LJJY].
225. Gershgorn, supra note 174 (“[I]n Argentina, . . . those who are caught
breaking quarantine are being forced to download an app that tracks their location. In Hong Kong, those arriving in the airport are given electronic tracking
bracelets that must be synced to their home location through their smartphone’s
GPS signal.”); Hamilton, supra note 174 (“In Poland, citizens under quarantine
have to download a government app that mandates they respond to periodic requests for selfies.”).
226. See Crocker, Opsahl & Cyphers, supra note 13; Kharpal, supra note 38
(“[A]ccording to the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a nonprofit digital privacy advocacy group, . . . collection of certain data like phone location, hasn’t been
proven to be effective in tracking the spread of the virus.”).
227. See, e.g., Kharpal, supra note 38 (“In the south Indian state of Kerala,
authorities have been using a mixture of telephone call records, surveillance camera footage and phone location data to track down people who may have been in
contact with coronavirus patients.”); Bracy, supra note 43 (interviewing Goh Jaeyoung, an official at the Korea Centers for Disease Control Prevention). The official told the BBC:
At first we interview the patients and try to gather information, emphasizing that this affects the health and safety of the entire people . . . .
Then, to fill in the areas they perhaps haven’t told us, and also to verify,
we use GPS data, surveillance camera footage, and credit card transactions to recreate their route a day before their symptoms showed.
Id.
228. For an example of such cross-referencing in South Korea, see Natasha
Singer & Choe Sang-Hun, As Coronavirus Surveillance Escalates, Personal Privacy
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not all DTA algorithms are transparent and/or open to peer review.
Because of the gap between privacy-preserving-design recommendations and the way DTAs are actually designed, it is important to
evaluate whether contact tracing through DTAs is a necessary measure to achieve their desired end.
B. Step II—The Necessity of DTA-Based Policy
Step II of the proportionality doctrine, necessity, requires an
assessment of whether a defined policy purpose (broad or narrow)
is sufficiently important to restrict rights.229 Traditional public
health methods advance the broad and the narrow purpose. Health
providers report confirmed infections to health departments,
whereas public health workers interview diagnosed patients and
trace their chain of contacts.230 Once they discern the diagnosed
patient’s movements and the patient’s close contacts, public health
workers may publicly publish the locations that the patient visited
and may further interview family members and others for addiPlummets, N.Y. TIMES, nyti.ms/2Y5CA4o [https://perma.cc/9S2K-GC9D] (Apr. 17,
2020) (reporting that after the South Korean authorities began posting information, including location history, when people left for work, where they changed
trains, about people who tested positive for coronavirus, internet mobs exploited
such data “to identify people by name and hound them”); Mark Zastrow, South
Korea Is Reporting Intimate Details of COVID-19 Cases: Has It Helped?, NATURE
(Mar. 18, 2020), https://go.nature.com/2Y7wzUH [https://perma.cc/7SUJ-TJMY]
(“In [South Korea], public information includes which rooms of a building the person was in, when they visited a toilet and whether or not they wore a mask. Even
overnight stays at ‘love motels’ have been noted.”).
229. See Barak, supra note 59, at 371 (“Canadian law has determined that an
object is proper if it is necessary for the realization of collective goals of fundamental importance. Therefore, the object must be ‘pressing and substantial.’ ”). Andrea
Jelinek states general principles of law should be considered when processing personal data:
Emergency is a legal condition which may legitimi[z]e restrictions of freedoms provided these restrictions are proportionate and limited to the
emergency period. . . . The GDPR allows competent public health authorities and employers to process personal data . . . . when processing is
necessary for reasons of substantial public interest in the area of public
health. Under those circumstances, there is no need to rely on consent of
individuals. . . . The GDPR also foresees derogations to the prohibition of
processing of certain special categories of personal data, such as health
data, where for reasons of substantial public interest in the area of public
health (Art 9.2.i), is possible on the basis of Union or national law, or
where there is the need to protect the vital interests of the data subject
(Art 9.2.c), as recital 46 explicitly refers to the control of an epidemic.
Andrea Jelinek, Statement on the Processing of Personal Data in the Context of the
COVID-19 Outbreak, EUR. DATA PROT. BD. 1, 1–2 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://bit.ly/
3nUkw7O [https://perma.cc/93US-KHWE].
230. See generally Key Information to Collect During a Case Interview, CDC,
https://bit.ly/3zqqqzz [https://perma.cc/A4T6-8X7L] (Oct. 21, 2020).
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tional details about the patient.231 They advise exposed contacts to
stay at home and offer treatment as needed. Additionally, information derived from public health surveillance can assist authorities in
their broader goal of assessing risk and can improve their ability to
respond quickly to changing circumstances during a pandemic.
Although essential needs are met by low-tech, traditional contact tracing methods, a DTA-based policy may be more efficient
because it addresses the two main flaws in the traditional approach:
reliance on a person’s memory to remember past encounters and on
the ability to alert only identifiable contacts. Most people do not
recollect every encounter they had in the two weeks before their
diagnosis. Even the most detailed interviews may result in significant gaps or mistakes when based solely on an individual’s memory.232 Even when interviewees remember, traditional contact
tracing is useful only for notifying contacts that the patient can remember and identify. DTAs do not rely on users’ memory and can
notify unidentified bystanders who have been in direct contact with
an infected user, such as someone who sat beside an infected user at
the coffee shop for an hour.
Moreover, traditional contact-tracing methods are too slow to
keep up with high infection rates, such as those of the
coronavirus.233 Almost half of coronavirus transmissions occur in
the very early phase of infection, before symptoms appear.234 It is
extremely important to alert people who have been exposed at this
stage to break the chain of transmission and limit exposure. Former
CDC Director Tom Frieden estimated that the United States would
need around 300,000 contact tracers to mount the same level of
contact tracing that helped contain the virus in Wuhan, China.235 A
231. See, e.g., Derek Thompson, The Technology That Could Free America
from Quarantine, ATL. (Apr. 7, 2020), https://bit.ly/2W14765 [https://perma.cc/
J3X4-FPVA] (reporting that, to stop the spread of Ebola, the CDC asked sick
people to list recent interactions with family, friends, and businesses, who would be
monitored for illness for several weeks).
232. Crocker, Opsahl & Cyphers, supra note 13.
233. See, e.g., Infectious Disease Experts Provide Evidence for a Coronavirus
Mobile App for Instant Contact Tracing, supra note 160.
234. Id.
235. Tom Frieden, A New Normal with COVID-19: The Next Steps We Must
Take, THINKGLOBALHEALTH (Apr. 6, 2020), https://bit.ly/3EPZ3TI [https://
perma.cc/M233-KKZT]; see Selena Simmons-Duffin, States Nearly Doubled Plans
for Contact Tracers Since NPR Surveyed Them 10 Days Ago, NPR (May 7, 2020,
5:36 PM), https://n.pr/39rsoVY [https://perma.cc/3MP2-F5JA]; James Temple, Why
Contact Tracing May Be a Mess in America, MIT TECH. REV. (May 16, 2020),
https://bit.ly/3u3PawK [https://perma.cc/N97Q-JPWL] (reporting an estimation
that 30 professionals for every 100,000 people, or more than 98,000 people nationwide, are needed for traditional methods). I have not found the estimation for
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report from Johns Hopkins University estimated the cost of hiring
100,000 new community workers for contact tracing to be $3.6 billion, meaning that at least $10 billion would be required for 300,000
tracers.236 Others have estimated that for the United States to reach
a comprehensive infrastructure comparable to the one that produced an efficient response in Wuhan, it would need to invest $20
billion into the public health workforce.237 While such an investment would still amount to just one percent of the more than three
trillion dollars in total coronavirus-relief funding to date,238 it would
still be higher than the costs invested in developing DTAs.239 A major incentive for abandoning the traditional method would be the
ability to use resources more efficiently. New York invested
$700,000 into a DTA, and the state will run a marketing campaign
to spread awareness of the app by purchasing internet, TV, print,
and radio advertisements.240 Virginia invested $229,000 to develop
and launch a DTA that costs about $29,000 a month to operate.241
Palm Beach County, Florida spent $774,000 on a DTA and an additional $100,000 on marketing, though only 27,000 people, roughly
1.8 percent of the Palm Beach County population, have
downloaded the app.242 But whether a policy aims to substitute or
required manpower to support DTAs, but it may be less. See also Casey Newton,
Why Bluetooth Apps Are Bad at Discovering New Cases of COVID-19, VERGE
(Apr. 10, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://bit.ly/3ACzxyQ [https://perma.cc/MJK7-ED7T]
(suggesting that people who are recently out of work could be hired for contact
tracing). With more DTAs, their added value becomes even less significant.
236. CRYSTAL WATSON ET AL., JOHN HOPKINS CTR. FOR HEALTH SEC., A
NATIONAL PLAN TO ENABLE COMPREHENSIVE COVID-19 CASE FINDING AND
CONTRACT TRACING IN THE U.S. 3 (2020), https://bit.ly/2XAHwxJ [https://
perma.cc/5UCY-U7UD]. That estimate as the minimum requirement was included
in a memo the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials submitted to
Congress. See Contact Tracing Workforce, ASSOC. OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL
HEALTH OFFS. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://bit.ly/3CzwHLw [https://perma.cc/58Y9DDC3].
237. Joshua A. Salomon & Arthur L. Reingold, Federal Funding for State and
Local Contact Tracing Efforts Is an Urgent Priority, and a Bargain, HEALTH AFFAIRS (May 11, 2020), https://bit.ly/3u1Fq6b [https://perma.cc/9GR6-6Q5G].
238. Id.
239. Compare Tyler Arnold, Virginia Uses CARES Act Funding to Launch
COVID-19 Tracing App, CTR. SQUARE (Aug. 5, 2020), https://bit.ly/3hUQs8c
[https://perma.cc/9FZV-N65M], with Andrea Downey, Total Cost of NHS ContactTracing App Set to Top £35 Million, DIGITAL HEALTH (Sept. 22, 2020), https://
bit.ly/3hVImfI [https://perma.cc/3MPN-D6XE] (describing costs of implementing
DTAs in the United Kingdom).
240. Wetsman, Contact Tracing Apps Promised Big and Didn’t Deliver, supra
note 167.
241. Arnold, supra note 239.
242. Danielle Waugh, Palm Beach County COVID App: Big Investment, Few
Users, CBS12 NEWS (Dec. 9, 2020), https://bit.ly/3lMNx2D [https://perma.cc/67YNXJER].
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supplement the existing tracing scheme, additional costs should be
considered, such as enforcing self-isolation requirements for people
diagnosed with COVID-19 and exposed contacts, as well as creating
a fully staffed epidemiology entity to investigate and secure people
without smartphones.243 Using DTAs to supplement the work of
contact tracers would make DTAs less necessary and beneficial,
given the significant overlap in their functions.
Beyond the narrow goal of stopping COVID-19 chains of
transmission, DTAs can provide systematic, continuous, and quality
data in real time to assist public health authorities in detecting susceptible populations, developing protective policy tailored to the
populations’ needs, and evaluating the effectiveness of social-distancing policies.244 Therefore, as an emergency measure, DTAs can
offer a more comprehensive and precise model than the traditional
method.
However, the contribution of DTAs is still limited. Both DTAbased methods and traditional methods face clear difficulties. In
Louisiana, for example, after 7 months and a $30 million investment, the traditional method did not produce the results health experts initially wanted. Aly Neel, a Health Department
spokeswoman, noted, “the largest barrier [was] a lack of accurate
contact information.”245 The number of people reached was lower
than 70 percent of total cases, and fewer than 30 percent of those
reached shared close contacts, but these contact-tracing rates have
improved slightly in recent months.246 If the percentage of people
alerted by traditional methods seems disappointing, DTAs’ percentage is much lower. Some people base DTA success rates on modeling, arguing that a DTA would be effective if 60 percent of the
population downloaded it, but actual adoption rates are insufficient.247 In New York, for example, fewer than 3,000 of 180,000
people diagnosed with COVID-19 were DTA users, and only 800
alerts were sent to exposed contacts.248 When considering necessity,
243. This is especially concerning given an existing shortage in contact tracers.
See Jacqueline Howard, New Data Highlights Shortage of Contact Tracers in Hotspot States, CNN HEALTH (Jun. 29, 2020, 9:47 AM), https://cnn.it/3EHsSFK [https:/
/perma.cc/DVR9-2JUN].
244. See Luca Ferretti et al., Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Suggests
Epidemic Control with Digital Contact Tracing, 368 SCIENCE 1, 1 (2020).
245. Sam Karlin, Contact Tracing Racks Up $30 Million in Costs but Hasn’t
Worked Out Like Officials Hoped, ADVOCATE (Dec. 5, 2020, 7:15 PM), https://
bit.ly/3Cy3ctf [https://perma.cc/62KG-QK88].
246. Id.
247. See supra Part III.A.2.
248. Hogan, supra note 166.
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lower costs of DTAs in comparison to traditional methods should
be considered along with their lower success rate.249
Success is harder to measure when the information gathered by
DTAs is more private, such as the number of alerts and whether
users have self-isolated. When DTAs keep information private, it is
nearly impossible to quantify how well they can actually cut transmission or to define what should be considered a success rate.250
Without this information, it is impossible to compare the success
ratio of DTAs to that of traditional contact tracing and to comprehensively assess the necessity of DTAs. It has been argued that using DTAs is an easy way to show that the government is reacting to
the pandemic.251 But, DTAs are not necessarily solutions that afford practical value that benefits scientific evaluation.252
The first two steps of proportionality analysis focused on rational reasons to use DTAs based on their suitability and necessity.
If DTAs are not suitable or necessary, there is no point in considering their proportionality compared to other policy options. The
analysis may end even before we reach Step III. If, on the other
hand, we find that society has an interest in the objective of developing more efficient public health surveillance, we should compare
DTA-based policy to other options, including the burdens posed by
each option on relevant rights. Step III therefore goes beyond assessing how we should apply privacy law or privacy-preserving principles to DTAs and compares DTA-based policy to other policies
aimed at confronting COVID-19.
C. Step III—Proportionality Stricto Sensu
“Proportionality stricto sensu” is the very heart of the proportionality doctrine. The requirement, in the words of C. J. Dickson,
is that there be
a proportionality between the effects of the measure which are
responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of ‘sufficient importance’ . . . .
Even if an objective is of sufficient importance, and the first two
elements of the proportionality test are satisfied, it is still possible
249. See Wetsman, Contact Tracing Apps Promised Big and Didn’t Deliver,
supra note 167 (quoting Professor Calo).
250. Wetsman, Contact Tracing Apps Promised Big and Didn’t Deliver, supra
note 167.
251. See Don Macpherson, COVID-19, Trudeau, Legault, and Do-SomethingIsm, MONTREAL GAZETTE (Mar. 3, 2020), https://bit.ly/3CTY5Eq [https://
perma.cc/J5JS-9DYD].
252. McDonald, supra note 41.
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that, because of the severity of the deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups, the measure will not be justified by
the purposes it is intended to serve.253

Unlike Steps I and II, Step III of the doctrine does not focus
solely on the policy measure taken (the DTA). Rather, it includes
an independent evaluation of the government’s reasons for using
that policy measure to achieve its public goal, and whether those
reasons justify the specific restrictions on the freedoms and rights of
citizens.254 It requires assessing whether the strength of the advanced interests justifies the derogation of rights.255 “Alongside the
need for a proper object lies the need for the proper mean.”256 The
severity of the intrusion must be proportionate, meaning that
greater intrusions should be founded on stronger justifications.
“The more basic the right that is being limited, and the more severe
the limitation, the greater the weight is that will be required from
the considerations justifying that limitation.”257 The burdens and
benefits must be fairly distributed across all stakeholders; if they
are not, the differences should be proportionate and mitigated.258
Past experience demonstrates that the “engagement of individuals and communities is essential for effectively managing the
spread of diseases.”259 If the public’s compliance is required, it is
crucial for policymakers to consider the burdens each policy imposes on individuals and to estimate the sacrifices that people are
expected to make. This Article follows this line of analysis by assessing the desirability and relative proportionality of three policies
that have been promoting the public interest in different ways: a
general shelter-at-home policy, a DTA-based policy, and a traditional contact tracing policy. Direct comparison may not be easy, as
253. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 139 (Can.).
254. Jackson, supra note 23, at 3099.
255. Id. at 3117.
256. Barak, supra note 59, at 372.
257. Id. at 375 (addressing the Israeli Court case HCJ 7052/03 Adalah v. Minister of the Interior, (1) 92 (2006) (Isr.) (available at https://bit.ly/3o9Bn5d [https://
perma.cc/V54T-XZ2D] ); see also R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 139–40 (Can.)
(“The more severe the deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the
objective must be if the measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society.”).
258. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, &
MATERIALS 526 (5th ed. 2011) (“In any proportionality inquiry . . . there will be
some ascription of weight or value to those interests, since this is a necessary condition precedent to any balancing operation.”). See generally Bernstein et al., supra
note 24, at 9–10.
259. Alicia Ely Yamin & Roojin Habibi, Human Rights and Coronavirus:
What’s at Stake for Truth, Trust, and Democracy?, HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. (Mar.
1, 2020), https://bit.ly/3zzX161 [https://perma.cc/H4C5-PZ2T].
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every policy varies in its effects on individual rights by imposing
different burdens on different groups of people. Thus, the doctrine
of proportionality compares, in a way, oranges to apples.
1. Shelter-at-Home Policy
A shelter-at-home policy restricts and interferes with an individual’s freedom of movement to cut the chains of transmission or
flatten the curve of infection by minimizing contacts between infected and uninfected people.260 This severe policy was implemented in many countries prior to reopening. The policy broadly
applies to the entire population, regardless of device ownership or
the number of contact tracers, and is thus easy to impose and quite
effective.261 But, the policy imposes heavy burdens on the freedom
of movement and other fundamental human rights protected by international and U.S. constitutional law.262
The burdens of a lockdown policy are unequally distributed.
Vulnerable populations in society, such as the sick, the working
class, the elderly, and the young, will be more burdened by
lockdowns.263 First, the sheltering-at-home policy affects the rights
of domestic abuse victims to bodily safety and the rights of people
who need medical care to access health-care centers.264 Additionally, restricting the freedom of movement might carry emotional
and mental costs, including anxiety, depression, and isolation. Many
people will pay a high price, including death, due to these long-term
and severe restrictions.265
260. Nicholas G. Evans, The Ethics of Social Distancing, PHILOSOPHER’S
MAG. (May 18, 2020), https://bit.ly/3Cu9oCC [https://perma.cc/T2MF-JBDE]; Maria Godoy, Flattening a Pandemic’s Curve: Why Staying Home Now Can Save
Lives, NPR (Mar. 13, 2020, 7:21 PM), https://n.pr/3CzujnX [https://perma.cc/
HT7U-B6EQ].
261. See Nils Haug et al., Ranking the Effectiveness of Worldwide COVID-19
Government Interventions, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 1303, 1308 fig.4 (2020).
262. For a discussion on freedom of movement in international law, see G.A.
Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). When
drafting the U.S. Constitution, the right was thought to be so fundamental that it
was not explicitly mentioned. In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), the court recognized “the right of a citizen to pass through
. . . any other state” as a fundamental right under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. For the definition of freedom of movement, see
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1869) (defining it as the “right of free ingress
into other States, and egress from them”).
263. See Adrianne Haggins & Arline Geronimus, Racial Disparities in the
Time of COVID-19, UNIV. OF MICH. INST. FOR HEALTHCARE POL’Y & INNOVATION (May 4, 2020), https://bit.ly/3hUKLY4 [https://perma.cc/5G38-F83B].
264. See Evans, supra note 260.
265. See id.
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Second, in circumstances where people have unequal backgrounds, closing workplaces may place heavier economic burdens
on people whose financial resources are strained due to the
lockdown. While some people can keep their jobs and work remotely, others, such as blue-collar workers, who are usually from
lower-income households, cannot perform their jobs from the comfort and safety of their homes. If they are unable to physically attend their workplaces, they may be deprived of their incomes.
Many people who have no financial reserves and already struggle to
make ends meet in regular economic settings cannot support their
households for long without the ability to work. Alternatively, lowincome workers may have jobs where they are expected to go to
work as essential workers, despite the risks of getting infected.266
Such workers will face increased exposure to COVID-19 and may
further expose their families to the virus when they return to their
homes.
Finally, a lockdown poses proximate and long-term harms to
individuals due to the restrictions on their family and personal life,
on their ability to self-develop, and on their right to pursue happiness as they see fit.267 Lockdowns deprived children of many of the
educational system’s benefits. Students may be further deprived if
they are unable to afford higher education due to the financial
harm they or their families suffered during and after the pandemic.268 Moreover, lockdowns hinder people’s ability to form
communities and to achieve a sense of belonging, which is at the
heart of human flourishing and prosperity.269 The elderly, particularly those who are sick or without support systems, may have difficulties functioning or interacting with society if municipal, state, or
federal programs stop running.270 At this point, after more than a
year of dealing with the coronavirus, a lockdown will probably inflict more harm than provide any benefit, and it may not be ethically justified.271
266. See Elizabeth Fernandez & Nicholas Weiler, Initial Results of Mission
District COVID-19 Testing Announced, UCSF (May 4, 2020), https://bit.ly/
3EHrvqM [https://perma.cc/HQ7T-G7JQ].
267. See generally Lee Elliot Major & Stephen Machin, Covid-19 and Social
Mobility (May 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
268. See id. at 5.
269. See generally Bernstein et al., supra note 24.
270. See generally id.
271. See Alberto Giubilini, The (Absent) Ethics of Lockdown, SPECTATOR
(Nov. 7, 2020), https://bit.ly/3EET4AX [https://perma.cc/39KH-JN9R]; see also The
Big Debate: Is Lockdown Wrong? SPECTATOR (May 26, 2020, 4:52 AM), https://
bit.ly/2Zb3ibU [https://perma.cc/TQQ3-JEQG].
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When it comes to actual quarantine and movement restrictions,
DTAs offer a more efficient and proportionate solution to minimize
peripheral violations of an individual’s freedom of movement that
otherwise occur during lockdowns. Only users exposed to people
diagnosed with COVID-19 would have to self-isolate while non-exposed users could move freely. DTA-based policy could therefore
be considered constitutional and more proportionate than shelterat-home policy, albeit it may be less effective in cutting chains of
transmission.
2. DTA-Based Policy
A DTA-based policy may not physically restrict movement and
therefore only minimally burdens the freedom of movement and
enables the economy to keep operating. However, DTAs survey the
entire user population whether healthy, carriers of the virus, or sick
(rather than surveying only infected individuals like the traditional
methods do). DTA use implicates the right to privacy (to be free of
surveillance), to freedom of association, and to peaceful assembly—
which are constitutional rights and even forms of positive or welfare rights.272
The suitability of privacy-preserving DTAs for the narrow purpose of stopping COVID-19 transmissions depends on user compliance. If users comply and self-isolate after receiving an alert, the
DTA policy can be effective. However, it remains unclear whether
diagnosed individuals are likely to report that they are positive for
COVID-19. DTAs do not operate in a vacuum—real life pressures
can impede user compliance. A telephone poll by the American Association for Public Opinion Research asked people whether they
would use an app that relied on people anonymously reporting to
the app that they have been diagnosed with the coronavirus.273 50
percent of respondents said that they would probably or definitely
not rely on anonymous reporting and 40 percent said that they
would be uncomfortable reporting themselves even if positively di272. See NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (ruling
that the First Amendment protects the freedom of association and that privacy of
membership was an essential part of this freedom); see also, Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“[I]mplicit in the right to engage in activities
protected by the First Amendment [is] a corresponding right to associate with
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”).
273. WASH. POST & UNIV. OF MD. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 1, 2 https://bit.ly/3EIsDdx [https://perma.cc/D297-TXZR] (last visited
Sept. 26, 2021) (asking whether people will use an app that would rely on people
anonymously reporting in the app that they have been diagnosed).
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agnosed as carrying the virus.274 Diagnosed users might refrain
from reporting if self-isolation would deprive them of their income,
if they could not afford to lose work, or if they could not secure
their rights or medical leave through labor and welfare systems. Regardless of DTA effectiveness, neither DTA designers nor policymakers can neutralize social pressures such as fear of being shamed
or other self-interests that may prevent compliance. If people refuse
to report, DTAs will not be able to contribute to public health.
Moreover, under-reporting will create a moral hazard.275 Personal duties and obligations will often outweigh an individual’s altruistic desire to benefit his or her community. Non-reporting users
are often free riders who can benefit from DTAs by protecting their
chosen contacts after being alerted about possible infection, without allowing the DTA to alert strangers who are exposed to them.
They do not help cut the chain of transmission. Additionally, underreporting may spur a false sense of safety in others, increase the risk
of infection, and lead individuals to relax precautions designed to
reduce overall transmission.276
3. Traditional Public Health Surveillance
In comparison to the two policies analyzed above, traditional
contact tracing imposes a more moderate burden on a smaller portion of the population. The traditional method limits tracing to only
people who are diagnosed with COVID-19 and found through the
health-care system and their transmission chains, rather than imposing surveillance mechanisms on the entire population. Traditional public health surveillance is achieved by interviewing those
who report positive diagnoses and those who suspect they are positive for COVID-19. However, this method may be less efficient because it misses unidentified, exposed individuals. Moreover, policy
based on traditional contact tracing is inherently broad in its design
unlike DTA-based policy. Public health authorities can use the information they gather to control the pandemic and the benefits that
the information would offer can be maximized. When a diagnosed
individual is identified, traditional contact tracing requires that the
person’s specific data pertinent to public health surveillance, such
as the person’s detailed symptoms and health information, be reported to public health authorities.277 That information is shared
274. Id. at 2.
275. See Soltani et al., supra note 145.
276. Morley et al., supra note 189, at 30.
277. To Provide Individuals with an Accounting for Disclosures, Does a Covered Entity Have to Document Each Medical Record That May Be Accessed by a
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with the relevant government agency rather than private companies, and thus remains subject to HIPAA rules.278 Information reported to public health authorities about infected individuals is not
considered an unjustified privacy violation, but rather a proportionate exception to the right to privacy for public health purposes.
To conclude, traditional contact tracing lays more moderate
burdens on fewer people than a DTA policy does (see Table A). It
achieves a more proportionate balance between broader public
health goals and minimizing the infringement of individual rights.
Despite some blind spots, it is less intrusive, more equitable by inflicting privacy violations that are limited in scope and time on
smaller parts of the population, and arguably produces better results than DTAs. For now, more efficient use of limited public
health resources should improve simpler, “old-school” public health
tools.279

Public Health Authority in The Course of Surveillance Activities That Involve All
Patient Records?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Aug. 28, 2003), https://
bit.ly/3hR62li [https://perma.cc/4NPG-9738]. For a discussion on how information
is collected in the United Kingdom, see Alex Hern, In the UK, Public Health England Will Keep Personal Data of People with Coronavirus for 20 Years, GUARDIAN (May 28, 2020, 9:51 AM), https://bit.ly/39uaZMp [https://perma.cc/8WCR8S46] (noting that NHS will keep the personal data of people with COVID-19 for
20 years and the personal data of those who are in contact with them for 5 years,
including their names, date of births, phone numbers, and home addresses).
278. See supra Part III.C.
279. For a discussion on other supporters of this view, see Soltani et al., supra
note 145; Evan Selinger, The Lasting Privacy and Civil Liberties Impacts of Responses to COVID-19, FORUM NETWORK (Apr. 15, 2020), https://bit.ly/3lOeQtf
[https://perma.cc/3EAG-UDRN].
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TABLE A
Rights in
question

Beneficiaries

Impact of
infringement

Who carries
the major
burdens?

Quarantine Consent

Traditional Privacy
contact
Freedom of
tracing
movement

Public health
benefits
Policy
benefits

Only
confirmed
cases and
their chains
of
transmission

The
government
(Healthsystem
costs).

Confirmed
cases
Those
identified
by contact
tracers

Not
required

DTAs

Privacy
Surveillance
Freedom of
association

Increased for Mass
users, but at
surveillance
some percent on all users
benefits the
public.
Commercial
benefits for
private
companies
Potential
policy
benefits

Smartphone
holders
(Policy based
on partial
data: those
whose data is
left outside).

Confirmed
cases
Those
alerted

Design
dependent

Lockdown

Freedom of
movement

Public

Vulnerable
populations:
sick, elderly,
young, lowincome.

Entire
population

Not
required

IV.

Entire
population

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

After carefully analyzing different tradeoffs in potential DTA
designs and in alternative policies, the Article will now address
macro considerations of DTA-based policy. These implications
show an even more nuanced discourse, beyond the limited realm of
privacy law.
A. Who Carries Responsibility for the Public?
DTA-based policy shifts public health responsibilities from the
state to the users, who must (1) download the apps; (2) report confirmed COVID-19 cases; and (3) self-isolate from their families and
homes, if alerted to exposure. The public’s responsibility goes beyond collaborating and obeying the government—as is the case
under a lockdown policy—to include the responsibilities to implement the infrastructure for responding to challenges in the community and to allow their personal devices to collect data.
There are two sides to a legal scheme that thrusts the responsibility onto users. On the one hand, given recent technological innovations, there is logic in relying on smartphone-based technology in
2021 as an infrastructure to confront COVID-19. Assuming people
who own smartphones always carry them, DTAs could be an easy
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and useful tool to discern the public’s daily whereabouts.280 Direct
measures that make compliance easier may be more important than
influencing attitudes and values. In an individualistic society, where
citizens are held responsible for civilian tasks such as filing their
own taxes, it may be proportionate to ask them to take this step to
end COVID-19.
On the other hand, approximately one in six Americans do not
have smartphones.281 Rates of smartphone ownership are much
lower among seniors, who are particularly vulnerable to the symptoms of COVID-19. 53 percent of people over the age of 65 own
smartphones.282 Many children also do not have smartphones at
young ages.283 Moreover, many apps require technical features that
preclude older devices.284 People with older smartphones who cannot afford to buy newer phones would not be able to benefit from
DTA system alerts.285
Relying on smartphones that not everyone can purchase provides a misleading database for policymaking. A smartphone-based
approach paints a biased picture that systematically excludes some
of the most vulnerable populations.286 Policies based on biased information will inevitably lead to portions of the population and
their interests not being accounted for.287 Policies utilizing other
methods may also be biased. A policy based on information gained
from traditional contact-tracing methods, for example, may overly
280. See Alexandra Arici, Location History—What Is It and How To Use It?,
AG (Sept. 28, 2018), https://bit.ly/3Av84yT [https://perma.cc/X2KQ-FCX2].
281. S. O’Dea, Smartphones in the U.S.—Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Aug. 4,
2021), https://bit.ly/3onfReO [https://perma.cc/LLH9-CYAA] (stating that 291.15
million people out of the 328-million U.S. population have smartphones).
282. Timberg et al., supra note 164; see, e.g., Morley et al., supra note 189, at
30 (“In the United Kingdom, around one-fifth of adults do not use a smartphone,
and so might be excluded from a digital contact-tracing programme.”).
283. Alex Fox, How Many Kids Have Smartphones? Even More Than You
Think, HILL (Dec. 4, 2019), https://bit.ly/3zHK8XN [https://perma.cc/B7HP-8XLZ]
(“By age 11, a little more than half of children in the United States have a
smartphone.”).
284. See, e.g., Morley et al., supra note 189, at 30 (“Australia, for example, has
no plans to make its app work with phones that use software older than Apple’s
iOS 10 or Android 6.0.”).
285. See Tim Bradshaw, 2 Billion Phones Cannot Use Google and Apple Contact-Tracing Tech, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 20, 2020, 12:29 PM), https://bit.ly/
3zpdmKY [https://perma.cc/79HF-TFRG] (stating that the number of smartphones
around the world without the necessary features is estimated at two billion).
286. McDonald, supra note 41 (“Technology markets are so fragmented that
it’s difficult to deliver relief equally, and pandemic response isn’t meant to skew
towards the most fortunate.”).
287. See Schwartz & Crocker, supra note 140 (“The population that carries a
networked phone at all times is not representative of the overall population . . . .”).
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focus on either people diagnosed with COVID-19 and their contacts or people who contact public health authorities, which also
provides a partial picture.288 However, resource allocation and policy decisions based on infection rates provide relevant justifications
for distinguishing between populations whose privacy is compromised.289 The traditional method does not systematically exclude
the same populations each time based on their access to digital devices because any person can get infected.290 COVID-19 surfaced
biases in the rates of sick people based on socio-economic level,
race, and age—groups of people who should be more attended to
by authorities.291 A focus on those populations may correct the biases to some extent by identifying where potential health burdens
are located and diverting more resources to over-burdened
populations.292
Finally, the decision to use technology disincentivizes policymakers from searching for an alternative policy that addresses the
needs of the entire population.293 With time, policies could offer
more opportunities for people with smartphones to live freely and
co-exist with the virus. For example, such policies would allow them
to go to work, school, and theatres, and in extreme cases, people
without smartphones would be deprived of certain social goods as
long as the pandemic is not over. For those without smartphones to
be entitled to the same social goods, supplementary mechanisms
would need to be in place, such as fast testing as a condition to
288. See, e.g., Cynthia Cox et al., How Have Healthcare Utilization and Spending Changed So Far During the Coronavirus Pandemic?, PETERSON-KFF HEALTH
SYS. TRACKER (Mar. 22, 2021), https://bit.ly/3tXWxFU [https://perma.cc/3X3UVLBB] (noting that calls to health care providers increased during the pandemic).
289. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 101, at 346 (“A reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to
the purpose of the law.”).
290. See Schwartz, supra note 40 (providing that a policy chosen must not
intentionally or unintentionally burden people on the basis of categories such as
race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, immigration status, gender and sexuality, or
disability).
291. See, e.g., Michael Atalla, What Two Neighborhoods in Chicago Show
About Disparities During COVID-19, HARVARD L. PETRIE-FLOM CTR. (Apr. 28,
2020), https://bit.ly/3hSTZnq [https://perma.cc/Y3XF-5KJB] (explaining that African Americans are infected with and dying from COVID-19 at higher rates than
whites).
292. See Tamar Sharon, When Google and Apple Get Privacy Right, Is There
Still Something Wrong?, MEDIUM (Apr. 15, 2020), https://bit.ly/3CxWdAH [https://
perma.cc/24V6-LJU8] (“[Data corporations] effectively move from having a seat at
the drawing table, where inclusion is (and should be) determined by technical expertise, to having a seat at the decision-making table, where inclusion should be
(but hardly is) determined by democratic values.”).
293. HCJ 6732/20 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Knesset (2021)
(Isr.).
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access places, and use of traditional tracing methods to inform them
that they were exposed to the virus. Providing resources, testing,
and manpower would increase the value of traditional public health
methods.294 For example, expanding testing to all close contacts of
infected people, even if they have not developed symptoms, could
increase the effectiveness of traditional contact-tracing programs by
as much as 2.2 times.295 Such an investment could make the benefit
of DTAs even less significant, while limiting the derogation of
rights.
B. The Private-Governmental Nexus
Our current reality introduces an external non-governmental
stakeholder in surveillance—”surveillance intermediaries.”296 Governments cooperate with private internet and communication infrastructure companies to regularly conduct surveillance.297 The CDC
received $500 million to create a COVID-19 “surveillance and data
collection system” intended to monitor the virus by aggregating
smartphone geolocation data, provided by mobile-advertising companies, to predict where the disease may spread next.298 Geolocation data has been gathered by telecommunications operators since
294. See Mirjam E. Kretzschmar et al., Impact of Delays on Effectiveness of
Contact Tracing Strategies for COVID-19: A Modelling Study, 5 LANCET PUB.
HEALTH 452, 456 (2020) (arguing that optimizing testing and tracing coverage and
minimizing tracing delays, for instance with app-based technology, further enhanced contact tracing effectiveness with the potential to prevent up to 80 percent
of all transmissions). But see McDonald, supra note 41 (noting that people seeking
more testing than they might otherwise may overwhelm health systems and require
preparation of supply and logistics).
295. Temple, supra note 235.
296. See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV.
99, 99 (2018) (“Surveillance intermediaries have financial and ideological incentives to resist government requests for user data.”).
297. See, e.g., Eva Galperin & Cindy Cohn, Private Companies, Government
Surveillance Software and Human Rights, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 28, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2XFToyU [https://perma.cc/YC8M-P2UT] (noting that governments
around the world are known to buy private company digital surveillance software
track and target people for human rights abuses); Heidi Boghosian, The Business
of Surveillance, A.B.A. (May 1, 2013), https://bit.ly/3u2gxaw [https://perma.cc/
Y7VX-BRU8] (stating that ChoicePoint, a corporate data aggregator, holds an “$8
million contract with the Justice Department [that] permits FBI agents to access
the company’s database of personal information on individuals” and that it has
contracts with 35 other government agencies).
298. See Aaron Holmes, The CDC Will Set Up a Coronavirus ‘Surveillance
and Data Collection System’ as Part of the $2 Trillion Stimulus Bill, Which President Trump Just Signed into Law, INSIDER (Mar. 27, 2020, 5:41 PM), https://bit.ly/
39rNbsw [https://perma.cc/WP23-MTBF].
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the coronavirus first broke out.299 Companies like Microsoft,
Google, Apple, and Facebook have been playing a significant role
during the pandemic by providing the U.S. government with services that process location and movement data from American
smartphones.300 This collaboration is not new. A few years ago, Edward Snowden’s leaks revealed that the U.S. government, through
the NSA, relied on the telecommunications provider Verizon to
produce daily records of metadata of international calls and relied
on companies such as Google and Apple for the collection of internet communications.301 Should the implications of public health
surveillance by private companies be even more alarming than government surveillance for the sake of national security?
Using this private-governmental collaboration to confront the
coronavirus is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, “outsourcing” governmental data collection and processing tasks during a
pandemic is efficient and may drop the costs of obtaining, keeping,
and analyzing data. DTA technologies are not very different from
the technologies operated by these companies on a regular basis.302
Companies have established infrastructures and resources that systematically collect and process user information as part of their adtargeting business models. They are better equipped to respond to
requests for information and to efficiently improve and implement
advanced social media and computer algorithms.303 The pandemic
has rendered these capabilities more valuable than ever.
On the other hand, HIPAA’s scope is limited to covered entities, such as health-care plans or health-care providers who transmits PHI in electronic form for patient treatment or health-care
operation, as defined by the Privacy Rule.304 Federal statutes perhaps create safeguards for governmental records, but those safe299. See Kharpal supra note 38; Hamilton, supra note 38 (noting that countries have been rapidly increasing surveillance of citizens to study and to minimize
the spread of COVID-19).
300. See Cooperation or Resistance?: The Role of Tech Companies in Government Surveillance, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1722, 1738 (2018) (explaining that technology companies can generate public information); Sheng, supra note 10.
301. See generally Edward Snowden, Permanent Record (2019).
302. See Jeramie D. Scott, Selling You Out: Mass Public Surveillance for Corporate Gain, HILL (Mar. 16, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://bit.ly/2XFEjgL [https://
perma.cc/ZQ6G-ZM73].
303. See Cooperation or Resistance?: The Role of Tech Companies in Government Surveillance, supra note 300, at 1737–39.
304. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a) (providing that covered entities business associates must ensure the integrity and protect all electronic protected health information); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining “protected health information” as individually
identifiable health information transmitted or maintained by a covered entity or its
business associates in any form or medium, which exempts a small number of cate-
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guards do not necessarily extend to DTAs.305 HIPAA may regulate
apps owned by covered entities, but neither Google nor Apple
meet the definition of a covered entity under HIPAA, and
HIPAA’s privacy standards do not apply to their and other companies’ DTAs.306 According to HIPAA’s Security Rule, contracts between “business associates” (service vendors not covered by
HIPAA) and covered entities contain specific, written safeguards
on the use and disclosure of PHI pursuant to HIPAA, and the contracts permit both the sharing and protection of required information.307 However, if a company is not an official business associate,
there are no restrictions on the way its apps process data. Private
companies can process data for profit without legal limitations because, unlike governmental or public organizations, they lack a system of checks and balances like those that apply to governmental or
public organizations.308 In this no man’s land, the absence of significant legislative safeguards threatens privacy and permits other
forms of abuse.309
gories of information, such as individually identifiable health information found in
employment records held by a covered entity in its role as an employer).
305. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(u)(5)(B). Additionally, the Computer Matching
and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (CMPPA), establishes procedural safeguards
regarding an agency’s use of Privacy Act records in performing certain types
of computer matching. According to the CMPPA, every agency conducting or participating in a matching program shall establish a Data Integrity Board to oversee
agreements. Id. § 522a(u). However, in the public interest, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget may approve a matching agreement notwithstanding the disapproval of a Data Integrity Board. See id. § 522a(u)(5)(B).
306. Cf. Sharon Bassan, Data Privacy Considerations for Telehealth Consumers Amid COVID-19, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 5 (2020) (discussing telehealth
medicine during COVID-19 and noting that no such agreements were in place with
telecommunication companies and that health information was not subjected to
HIPAA protections).
307. 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e); see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(1)(i)–(ii) (providing
that business associates’ roles include claims processing, data analysis, utilization
review, and billing and that their services to a covered entity are limited to legal,
actuarial, accounting, consulting, data aggregation, management, administrative,
accreditation, or financial services).
308. Surveillance intermediaries are subject to three major statutory constraints: The Wiretap Act of 1968, governing the interception of electronic and
wire communications; the Stored Communications Act of 1986, governing access
to stored information; and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, governing the collection of foreign intelligence.
309. See, e.g., Lauren Feiner, Apple and Google CEOs Should Be Held Responsible for Protecting Coronavirus Tracking Data, Says GOP Sen. Hawley,
CNBC: TECH, https://cnb.cx/3lLYj9j [https://perma.cc/2343-GUBT] (Apr. 21, 2020,
5:28 PM) (reporting that Republican Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri asked the
CEOs of Apple and Google to hold themselves personally liable for protecting the
data collected through their contact-tracing efforts related to the coronavirus).
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When data collection is outsourced to private companies without legal protections for user privacy, users have to depend on the
goodwill of technology companies to avoid misusing data or violating their privacy.310 Unlike government entities, commercial stakeholders have their own interests in surveillance that are not
necessarily driven by public values or governmental goals. They develop technologies for commercial reasons that may conflict with
other interests, including the interests of users.311 Companies can
be held accountable through their privacy policies and terms of use,
but those terms often provide minimal privacy protection, if any.
According to most privacy policies, companies often have the right,
for example, to resell their software, services, and database to
others or to use the information themselves for their machine’s
learning models.312
Users pay a high price for the government’s outsourcing of
data collection to private companies. Because of their involvement
in addressing COVID-19 issues, private companies can access and
collect data that is normally protected.313 While some basic liberties
are temporarily restricted and then restored (such as the freedom of
movement), the right to privacy is indefinitely infringed by surveillance mechanisms that permit the re-use of data after its initial collection. Companies can take the user data they already possess, tie
it with the new sensitive information they can access, and use the
data in new invasive ways for their own commercial interests. In
310. See WASH. POST & UNIV. OF MD. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT, supra note 273, at 2 (providing that 56% showed distrust in tech
companies, 43% showed distrust in universities and public health agencies, and
52% showed distrust in health insurance companies when people were asked how
much they trust different sectors to ensure that people who report being diagnosed
with coronavirus through their smartphone app remain anonymous).
311. See Baker, supra note 204.
312. Kalev Leetaru, Much of Our Government Digital Surveillance Is Outsourced to Private Companies, FORBES (June 18, 2019, 8:46 PM), https://bit.ly/
3CB14RK [https://perma.cc/8BPR-73EQ].
313. See Ceyhan, supra note 38, at 40–41. Surveillance raises questions beyond the context of public health crisis, such as whether the use of any form of
mass surveillance mechanism is justified or not. A reference to Foucault’s concept
of biopoliticized security is worth mentioning. According to Foucault’s biopolitics
concept, surveillance is a political technology that focuses on the human body and
its movements, which serves to efficiently manage populations by observing, classifying, and sorting individuals. Id. at 38. Such surveillance is often imposed in times
of uncertainty and can be understood as a governmental form of seeking maximum
efficiency for the regulation of bodies and species. Foucault’s concepts of biopower
as they are reflected in the implications of DTAs on political rights are beyond the
scope of this article and should be further explored in future research. See, e.g., id.
at 38, 44 (“Google for instance has become the most powerful biopolitical surveillance tool as it gathers, processes, and mines large volumes of information about
people and groups.”).
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this process, users are treated as customers whose interests are addressed through business models, risk assessment, and market analysis, rather than as individuals whose rights should be protected by
the law.314
Most companies undoubtedly operate out of goodwill while assisting governments during the pandemic. Current DTA designs
may preserve privacy, and the information retrieved from DTAs
may be confidential for now. Indeed, several scholars have argued
that Google is doing a relatively good job in protecting user privacy
on its COVID-19-related platform.315 However, the design could
easily be changed in the future. It would be easy for companies and
developers holding user data to either change their DTA designs
and repurpose their platforms or to reuse the stored data for commercial purposes.316 Apple and Google pledged not to allow any
form of targeted advertising within their COVID-19-related
apps.317 However, corporations have reneged on their commitments
in the past, diminishing their credibility. For example, DeepMind
Health, a collaboration between Google and the NHS, produced a
UK-health-related app named “Streams” that later became a
Google product, thus betraying consumer trust and Google’s own
pledge that “data will never be connected to Google accounts or
services.”318 Google has also been fined $57 million by French authorities for a lack of transparency regarding how data is collected
across its services.319
314. See Maria P., Sample Privacy Policy Template, PRIVACYPOLICIES, https://
bit.ly/3nPmp42 [https://perma.cc/3ZPT-M29T] (June 2, 2021) (addressing privacy
law as an “agreement” reflecting companies’ business models and referring to
users as consumers).
315. VON ARX ET AL., supra note 141. But see Jessica Davis, EFF Warns
COVID-19 Tracing Apps Pose Cybersecurity, Privacy Risks, HEALTH IT SEC.
(Apr. 29, 2020), https://bit.ly/3CwkEOU [https://perma.cc/8CB7-JWT2] (explaining that industry stakeholders are concerned that Google’s contact-tracing technology may be overreaching and raises an inherent risk of cyberattacks).
316. See Russel Brandom, Apple and Google Pledge to Shut Down
Coronavirus Tracker When Pandemic Ends, VERGE (Apr. 24, 2020, 12:15 PM),
https://bit.ly/3hVEc7A [https://perma.cc/AL9S-PCQ3].
317. Newton, Apple and Google Answer Our Questions, supra note 193;
Raphael, supra note 142.
318. Alex Hern, Google ‘Betrays Patient Trust’ with DeepMind Health Move,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2018, 7:16 AM), https://bit.ly/3o2Zuno [https://perma.cc/
HV5E-V9P5]; see also Julia Powles, Why Are We Giving Away Our Most Sensitive
Health Data to Google?, GUARDIAN (July 5, 2017, 11:34 AM) https://bit.ly/2Zp1sod
[https://perma.cc/XB5Z-D2F5].
319. Adam Satariano, Google Is Fined $57 Million Under Europe’s Data Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019), https://nyti.ms/3hUHzvy [https://perma.cc/
4DPM-YU7R].
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Health, location, and association information is too important
to be left solely to a corporation’s discretion to arbitrarily declare
its protection in its privacy policy. One may argue that if the DTAs
are designed to ensure that information is confidential and/or regulated, then a DTA-based policy is proportionate. Yet, the mere implementation of surveillance mechanisms in society is worrisome. A
policy that institutionalizes the technological capacities of private
companies to survey the public during emergencies renders surveillance mechanisms legitimate and socially acceptable and may endanger our social fabric in the long run.320 In these circumstances,
advancing the public health interest might not justify such an infringement of individual rights.321
CONCLUSION
To conclude, a carefully designed, digital, public health surveillance scheme is an appealing policy. However, by analyzing DTAbased policy through the doctrine of proportionality, this Article
has shown that even when proven effective and beneficial, DTAbased policy is riskier and less proportionate than traditional contact-tracing methods. DTAs offer either limited benefits (if privacypreserving designs are implemented into a narrow policy goal of
contact tracing) or an infringement of rights disproportional to the
benefits provided (if a broader goal of informing health authorities
is considered). Moreover, privacy-preserving designs are insufficient to protect individuals from the long-term ramifications of the
mass-surveillance mechanisms employed by commercial companies.
The use of DTAs during COVID-19 is a fascinating case
study—it illustrates the tension between the benefits and the perils
associated with the use of new technology during an emergency
where the public depends on government decisions more than usual
and is therefore more willing to accept any solution. But DTAs
should not be implemented before society has had the opportunity
to profoundly debate their implications.322 In an ideal world, prior
to embedding any surveillance technology in society, legislation
should carefully temper a company’s economic prerogatives with a
320. See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States
of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004) (examining how the extraordinary tends to become ordinary and how exceptional
measures can become accepted norms as people adjust to a continuing emergency
without promise of an end).
321. See Barak, supra note 59, at 371.
322. See Annette Zimmerman et al., Technology Can’t Fix Algorithmic Injustice, BOS. REV. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://bit.ly/3zu5OXs [https://perma.cc/DVM2ZXE6].
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customer’s privacy interest.323 In reality, such legislation requires
legislators to negotiate with the most influential entities in the market, and it is extremely hard to pass. Future discussions should ask
when will a threat to public health be severe enough to justify a
public policy that permits the collection and use of sensitive personal information, and how different goal definitions affect social
perceptions of the public interest and/or individual rights. Society
should decide how much it values public health, privacy, and digital
surveillance, and whether it is willing to replace privacy for public
health or vice versa.324
The doctrine of proportionality reflects the limitations of legal
discourse and the benefits of a broader, more nuanced approach to
law, technology, and society. Privacy law considers a limited range
of micro-level issues and misses the broader macro-level picture of
how technology builds society, establishes power relations, and promotes values that often contradict our assumptions about the freedom and convenience created by technology. The question of
whether to dismiss technology will not arise often, and discourse on
how to regulate it will occur only long after technology is available
for use. The proportionality framework considers broader implications than does the traditional data and privacy law scheme, and it
leads to different results. If left unregulated, technology will be subject to market forces and controlled by private companies rather
than the government. Under the privacy-law approach, legal considerations are applied to the design of technology and offer microlevel technological solutions, detached from macro-level social considerations and specific social contexts. Proportionality identifies
issues that are under-addressed within the privacy-law approach
and offers an opportunity to examine how governments achieve
and justify the acceptance and assimilation of new technological
policy measures, which may take societies in new directions.

323. See McDonald, supra note 41; see, e.g., Bassan, supra note 306, at 10–11
(suggesting expanding HIPAA coverage or using FTC § 5 for the similar case of
telehealth); Matt Cagle, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter Provided Data Access
for a Surveillance Product Marketed to Target Activists of Color, ACLU NORCAL
(Oct. 11, 2016), https://bit.ly/2Zp1lsN [https://perma.cc/PT2D-EC56] (“Social media companies should not provide data access to developers who have law enforcement clients and allow their product to be used for surveillance . . . .”).
324. See Letter from Robert Menendez et al., U.S. Senator, to Tim Cook,
CEO, Apple (Apr. 3, 2020), [https://perma.cc/2XQL-XL9Q] (writing in a letter to
Apple that “Americans should not have to trade their privacy at the expense of
public health needs.”).
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APPENDIX A—PRIVACY-PRESERVING DESIGN SUGGESTED
COVID-19 DTAS

FOR

The data reported in Appendix A demonstrates an agreement
that apps should collect, process, retain, use, store, and disclose the
least amount of personal information necessary to ensure the accuracy and effectiveness of DTAs (i.e., the principle of data
minimization).

Necessity
Authority/
lawfulness
Impact
Value/fairness
Community
engagement
Communication
Consent
Voluntariness
Anonymity
Transparency
Knowledge of
terms
Accountability
Privacy
Security Safeguards
Data minimization
Limited Use/
Time
Restricted
access
Data Integrity
User Control
Privacy oversight

CDC325 WHO326 Micro- Canadian
soft327 Privacy
Commiss.328
x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x
x
x
x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x

x
x
x

x

x
x
x

x

x

x
x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x

x

Johns
NHS330 EU
EU
EDPB333
Hopkins329
Parl.331 Commiss.332

x
x
x

x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x

325. Covid-19 Contact Tracing for Health Departments, CDC, https://bit.ly/
3krA00S [https://perma.cc/VJ9Q-8ECW] (May 17, 2020).
326. Ethical Considerations to Guide the Use of Digital Proximity Tracking
Technologies for COVID-19 Contact Tracing, WHO (May 28, 2020), https://bit.ly/
2XKLcgw [https://perma.cc/RVL6-ETM6].
327. Julie Brill & Peter Lee, Preserving Privacy While Addressing COVID-19,
MICROSOFT (Apr. 20, 2020), https://bit.ly/3nX9MWi [https://perma.cc/P5SJXAHF].
328. Supporting Public Health, Building Public Trust: Privacy Principles for
Contact Tracing and Similar Apps, OFF. OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN. (May
7, 2020), https://bit.ly/3nS59wI [https://perma.cc/7Q4D-5PWA].
329. DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING FOR PANDEMIC RESPONSE 78 (Jeffrey P.
Kahn ed., 2020).
330. Letter from Jonathan Montgomery, Chair, NHS Ethics Advisory Bd., to
Sec’y of State (Apr. 24, 2020), https://bit.ly/2YfEnDQ [https://perma.cc/9B5PBVHT] (identifying seven principles to ensure that the COVID-19 contact-tracing
app is ethical: value, impact, security, privacy, accountability, transparency, and
control).
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331. See generally Dumbrava, supra note 188.
332. Eur. Comm’n, Communication from the Commission—Guidance on
Apps Supporting the Fight Against COVID 19 Pandemic in Relation to Data Protection, 2020 O.J. (C 124) (Apr. 17, 2020), https://bit.ly/3u1NLXa [https://perma.cc/
4975-CQWW]; European Commission Press Release IP/20/669, Coronavirus: Guidance to Ensure Full Data Protection Standards of Apps Fighting the Pandemic
(Apr. 16, 2020), https://bit.ly/3CwivTm [https://perma.cc/UJY9-UTWE].
333. Jelinek, supra note 229.
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